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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
CIA TRAINING PROGRAM

August 1960

MORI/CDF

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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1. This study was initiated at the request of the DDCI to determine the nature and extent of the Agency's training effort and to evaluate its effectiveness in meeting the Agency's present and future needs. It should be noted that this is an Agency-wide functional study and is not intended to be a formal inspection of the Office of Training. Problems of organization and management, processes and procedures or administration are not dealt with in this report unless they have significant bearing on training objectives.

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2. All formal training programs and facilities in headquarters were examined [REDACTED]

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specifically for this study. However information gathered in IG field inspection trips has been incorporated where appropriate. The principal

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[REDACTED] has been extensively reviewed during the past two years and further consideration of that problem is not deemed pertinent to this report.

3. Evaluation of the effectiveness of Agency training was obtained through interviews with operations officers recently returned from overseas duty, students currently enrolled in training courses, present and former Junior Officer Trainees, supervisors of employees with technical skills acquired through Agency training and with more than 100 senior officers in the Clandestine Services and elsewhere in headquarters. Evaluation also took into consideration the substantive content of training courses in relation to the needs of an intelligence service, the

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duration of training periods and level of instruction, the qualifications and experience of instructors and the relationship of training to career planning and development.

4. The Agency's training effort also has been studied in comparison with the programs of other government agencies particularly that of the Foreign Service. Some industrial programs have been weighed as well to provide some background for an evaluation of the Agency's approach to induction, basic and advanced preparatory training.

5. In total the following pages present a comprehensive view of all of the activities currently engaged in for the preparation of people to do the work expected of them by the Agency. The final section of the report attempts to project intelligence training needs into the future and suggests a program that will achieve the desired objectives.

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II. ADMINISTRATION OF AGENCY TRAINING

A. Legal Authority

1. The Agency's legal authority to provide training for its employees at public expense is granted by the Government Employees Training Act (P.L. 85-507; 72 Stat. 329), enacted in 1958. By Executive Order 10,805, dated April 30, 1959, the President designated the Agency as excepted from various specific provisions of the Act referring chiefly to the responsibility of the U.S. Civil Service Commission for the promotion, coordination, review, etc., of the training programs and operations provided for by the Act. Prior to the enactment of the 1958 Act, the Agency's authority for training activities was section 4 of the CIA Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 208), which section was repealed by the 1958 Act.

2. The chief provisions of the 1958 Act applying to the Agency may be summarized as follows: Congress declared its policy to be that "self-education, self-improvement and self-training" by Government employees "be supplemented and extended by Government-sponsored programs for the training of such employees in the performance of official duties and for the development of necessary skills and knowledge and that such programs should be designed to lead to improved public service, dollar savings, and the building and retention of a permanent cadre of skilled and efficient Government employees, well abreast of scientific, professional, technical, and management development both in and out of Government." The Act then proceeds to direct the head of each department to place in effect a program for the training of employees in such

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department by, in and through Government facilities and non-Government facilities, and authorizes the head of each department to pay the salary of employees under his jurisdiction during the period of training as well as the expenses of such training. It is directed that each such program shall provide for the encouragement of self-training. The Act requires each department head to "conduct and complete a review of the needs and requirements of such department for the training of employees under its jurisdiction" at least once every three years. This report constitutes such a review.

3. The source of authority for all training administered by the Agency to persons who are not employees is section 8.B. of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (P.L. 81-110).

B. Scope of Present Program

1. CIA's training effort has been characterized by early years of extremely rapid growth, followed by consolidation of programs and the slow evolution of a general philosophy in the operating offices on the place of training in intelligence. The achievements thus far with respect to induction training have been substantial. Integrated training programs are today provided to the great majority of the Agency's new employees as a matter of policy. In 1960, for the first time, recruitment and training of professional officers for the DD/P and to meet about one-fourth of the similar requirements of the DD/I and DD/S are to be accomplished through the Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP). Training programs for clerical and semi-professional employees have been solidly established for much longer periods of

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time. Basic general training for these categories has been undertaken by the Office of Training. Where special skills have been involved the training most frequently has been administered by the component concerned or arranged externally.

2. Training objectives and programs have varied considerably among the Directorates of the Agency. The DD/S with its many specialized assignments has tended towards local training programs, as for example in the Offices of Communications and Logistics. The DD/I in light of its requirement for specialists in both social and physical sciences has been oriented towards external training and to date has preferred to hire individuals previously trained and requiring no extensive further investment on the part of the Agency. The DD/P with its generic requirement for professional competence in the domain of Clandestine intelligence has had to look internally to the instrument of the JOIP, which it now fully accepts for all new officer training, and, generally, to its own resources for advanced training of journeymen officers in the specialized areas of operations.

3. Taken as a whole, CIA training does not yet reach extensively nor systematically into the area of advanced training of career employees.¹ To an important degree training is a derivative of organizational policy¹ in the broad field of personnel management and since the Agency has not yet reached a consensus on the place of such tools as job standards, rotation, competitive evaluation, mid-career training, senior executive training and sabbaticals, there is no obvious and self-evident career training pattern instilled in the minds of either the Agency's staff

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employees or its managers."

4. "The absence of a general conviction on the place of training in career development is also explained by the fact that the first generation of intelligence officers acquired their skills and know-how on the job and with minimum exposure to formal training. Their integration into a training system has been and is apt to remain on a catch-as-catch-can basis pending the evolution of the stronger personnel management tools referred to above."

5. The subordination of the Office of Training to the DD/S has also materially limited the power of the Director of Training to develop and to control unified Agency training policy. There has been considerable growth over the years in OTR responsibility to undertake Agency-wide coordination of training but little augmentation of its power to enforce a common policy. Security, compartmentation, and diversity of program have perhaps made it inevitable from the beginning that the component offices would retain as local prerogative training responsibilities which in other organizations are more customarily concentrated in a single authority and clothed with the power of the senior command.

C. Cost


1. The Office of Training has recently assembled figures on the cost of training in CIA which are incomplete in some respects but represent the best information available at the present time. The subject is complex and its measurement requires various arbitrary decisions with respect to:

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- a. Separation of capital investment from operating costs in training programs.
- b. Allocation of cost to training where a facility has multiple uses and its personnel have other responsibilities in addition to training.
- c. Allocation of cost to training where the trainee is moving from apprentice to journeyman status and his efforts are increasingly productive in character.

The enumeration of major categories of CIA training and their costs in FY 59 is as follows:

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Office of CommunicationsInternal Training Program

[] Training

Grand Total

2. The list omits outlays for instructors, equipment, and facilities providing both formal courses and on-the-job training in six offices or staffs of the DD/S, five offices of the DD/I and three elements of the DD/P.

3. The cost of Training Officers is not included. One or more individuals are assigned in each major component of the Agency, usually part-time, to develop and process training requirements and to conduct liaison with OTR. There is an additional investment in clerical support for most of these officers.

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4. Facility costs are omitted in the case of the principal field training installation of the Office of Communications [] [] Co-users to whom this cost has been allocated include the CIA emergency relocation program and the engineering development activities of OC.

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5. The figures include student salaries in the case of JOT's who are assigned to OTR during their first two years with the Agency. However, eighteen months of this two-year period, on the average, are spent on the job in increasingly productive assignments. Salaries of all other trainees are not included.

6. A rough indicator of total cost of student participation in Agency training programs can be obtained by application of the now

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suspended five per cent requirement on staff in training to the annual expenditure of the Agency on wage and salary. The five per cent rule, while in effect, varied considerably in yield between components and through time. A figure of three per cent is perhaps more realistic. In the Office of Communications, to cite a specific example, estimated salaries of employees while in training, using GS-8 as the mean, totalled [] in 1959. It is estimated that the total of all expenditures for training in the Agency will approximate [] annually. This would include the cost of training facilities, training personnel and salaries of trainees.

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7. The Agency obviously has it within its power to alter present proportions between formal and on-the-job training so that employee departures from duty for purposes of training will be substantially reduced and instructor, facility and student salary costs thereby curtailed. On the other hand, the purpose of training is to make an investment in the employee which will yield an increase in productivity and thereby recoup the initial investment and more. The Agency may well look forward to training economies through consolidation of facilities, better scheduling of employee participation and the development of more efficient instructors and instructional techniques. The growing complexity of professional operations and of skills required by intelligence make it extremely unlikely that the Agency can afford or will decide to spend less than present-day amounts on the preparation of its employees to perform their jobs.

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III. OFFICE OF TRAINING

A. Introduction

1. The antecedents of CIA's present-day training program are readily identified for it has been the undoubted good fortune of the Agency to descend in continuous line from the wartime Office of Strategic Services. Even today there continue among the staff a substantial contingent of officers who helped to establish OSS training programs, who were trained in OSS classrooms, and who have conducted and evaluated the operations of the past to derive the content of developing intelligence doctrine.

2. Continuity in terms of the administrative structure of training understandably became extremely thin immediately after the war when the contracting OSS structure was divided with operations components in the form of the Special Services Unit passing to the control of Army and research elements transferring to the Department of State. The reunion of the parts took place during 1946 and 1947 first by formation of the Central Intelligence Group, then by establishment of the CIA. Included among the elements was a training division in the Office of Special Operations which for the next two years or so required just five rooms in Que Building for administrative purposes and numbered on paper ☐ staff positions.

3. The administration of training in its present-day form was inaugurated on 3 January 1951 with the establishment of an Office of Training and the EOD of its first and present director, Col. Matthew C. Baird. He reported for the next four years directly to the DCI, until

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early in 1955, at the recommendation of the Inspector General, OTR (along with the Offices of Personnel and Communications, which had also been reporting directly to the DCI) was brought under the Deputy Director for Support where it is presently located.

4. The Training Division of OSO had been expanded in 1949 to provide for the training needs of the Office of Policy Coordination. There was a substantial requirement for paramilitary training in this period [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] preempted these facilities, the Training 25X1
Division began the search for a permanent installation and was moving along towards the choice of [REDACTED] 25X1
at the time of its integration with the Office of Training.

5. The Director of Training was charged at the outset with responsibility for the development of a junior officer training program and for the planning of career development. By mid-1951 he had launched the first JOT class which ran for fourteen weeks and concentrated on clandestine tradecraft including the orientation, basic and advanced operations courses provided by the Training Division of the DD/P. The training efforts of the support and research components of CIA were virtually nonexistent up to this time; consequently OTR was extremely active in the first few months in launching an orientation program for all new employees of the Agency, induction and refresher training for clericals, and instruction in languages. Also in July of this year the first career service plan was submitted to the DCI. The plan, however, called for a high degree of selectivity of

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25X9 personnel. In consequence, task forces were established to study the issues involved and approximately two more years elapsed before a career service in its present-day form was inaugurated. 25X9

6. OTR acquired a staff of some [] persons during 1951, then doubled in size in each of the successive two years. In 1954 it numbered above [] persons on duty and levelled off at this strength where it has remained to the present. This rapid expansion not only reflected the general growth pattern and training demands of the Agency, but, in addition, it indicated the planning and development of a permanent, large-scale organization able to deal with a broad range of typical present-day governmental training requirements. In 1953 the curriculum was expanded to provide courses in communism, in supervision and management and in such administrative areas as operations support and administrative procedures. From that time forward there has been a proliferation of courses adapted to special needs, but no further expansion into major new departments of instruction. The relative youth of the Agency, however, may have forestalled thus far the evolution of a training pattern and facility for mid-careerists, an area which the Department of State has been investigating actively in recent years.

7. About five years were required to stabilize the Office of Training in its mission and functions and in its present structure. Until early 1953, the Office consisted of two components with a Deputy Director (Special) directing covert training programs and a Deputy Director (General) directing the overt programs of the Agency. In 1953 substantial unification occurred with the designation of a single deputy

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director, four staffs and eight operating divisions. In 1955 proceeding jointly with the Inspector General and Management Staff, OTR arrived at its present organization in four major schools:

Operations School

Intelligence School

School of International Communism

Language and Area School

supported by four staffs:

Plans and Policy Staff

Assessment and Evaluation Staff

Registrar (including control of external training)

Support Staff

8. There are several aspects of CIA training history worthy of special note.

a. The extreme diversity of skills and professions employed by intelligence -- estimated at 1250 distinct job descriptions at the present time -- and the extent of compartmentation dictated by security considerations undoubtedly combine to explain the large number of relatively autonomous component training programs. Communications training, for example, with roots deep in OSS experience, has remained the exclusive responsibility of the Office of Communications from the beginning. In the DD/P relatively large scale systems have evolved in the Technical Services Division -- audio surveillance, secret writing and photography for example -- and in the SR Division in covert training

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[] DD/S in turn has sponsored the development of local training programs in Logistics, Security and Medical Staff for example, and DD/I has developed formal courses including information handling and statistics. There are a number of influences at work tending to stabilize these programs in their present locations among which security considerations, limited demand, accessibility and responsiveness to local needs may be noted.

b. A second pervasive influence affecting training policy has been the quality and location of physical training facilities. Dispersion of Agency offices and buildings has been paralleled by the dispersion and general inadequacy of OTR classrooms. Some of the present-day administrative pattern undoubtedly reflects the strong desire of operating offices to economize on staff and instructor time through sharply focussed local training.

c. Finally, it is a frequently stated objective of all government training programs to avoid duplication in an internal training system of courses and programs readily available and often of high quality offered at universities or elsewhere. Both DD/S and DD/I have acknowledged this principle by sending staff outside for training in the operation of specialized equipment; e.g., International Business Machine, and for graduate study in such fields as mathematics and economics. The DD/P has made some use of external language training by OTR arrangement although this for the most part has involved use of State Department's Foreign Service Institute facilities rather than private institutions. Notwithstanding, the Agency has not, for reasons

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of security, placed heavy reliance to date on outside or shared community facilities.

9. Mention should also be made of the effort over the past ten years to establish training prerequisites for job assignments and to derive predictable student enrollments on which to base development of training facilities, recruitment of instructors, and scheduling of classes. For jobs involving technical skills of one kind or another, the component offices have acted responsibly and with considerable uniformity to stipulate training prerequisite to appointment or promotion to journeyman status. Beginning as early as 1952 the principal staffs and some divisions of the DD/P issued instructions which specified professional intelligence training essential to the principal job assignments. The DD/I did not move as positively in this direction because of the expectation that most of the professional skills it required could be recruited ready trained in the open market. Unfortunately, Agency experience with job standards has produced discouraging results, to the extent in some cases that regulations have been rescinded. Training requirements have all too consistently taken second place to operating priorities deriving from international crises, health problems, personal preference or prejudice. The Agency's experience, however, has not been unique as is apparent in the following recent comment on the much older training program of the Department of State:

"In the Department of State, it is probably still true that many officers dislike being assigned to training. Operations officers in the geographic bureaus try to prevent their best men from being assigned to training and they tend to succeed in this endeavor ... It seems likely that training in the Department of State will never

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be of high quality until training is accepted -- as it is in the military services -- as an essential part in the process of developing high-quality officers." pp 40-41, Recruitment and Training for the Foreign Service of the United States, Staff Study for the Committee on Foreign Relations. GPO. 1958.

10. It should be noted in conclusion that an earlier Agency-wide measure to deal with these questions was launched in 1956 with the issuance of [] "Headquarters Participation in Training." This regulation stipulated that it would be the policy of the Agency to expend at least five per cent of its total man-hours of headquarters "on-duty" staff personnel in training. While the regulation remains in force at the present time, a general revision of training regulations is currently in process and the five per cent requirement has been held in abeyance by informal action for the past twelve months. The requirement, nevertheless, had a major influence on component office policy towards training and on the volume of training provided to Agency personnel. It moved the component offices and the Office of Training to undertake orderly inventory of training courses and better programming of training requirements. Many offices substantially met the five per cent requirement and all offices have given their training problems more careful consideration as a result. It seems certain that the measure made a timely contribution towards the evolution of a better coordinated, Agency-wide training program. On the other hand continuation of an arbitrary figure for training simply perpetuates training for the sake of compliance with a regulation. The Agency is now mature enough to require the supervisors to accept the responsibility for insuring that all personnel receive the training they require.

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B. The Intelligence School

1. The five faculties comprising the Intelligence School include intelligence orientation, intelligence production, clerical training, operations support and management. There is a T/O of instructors of whom five are on assignment from other parts of the Agency. There is no simple rule of thumb setting the jurisdictional lines of the School. Orientation, clerical training and management training are Agency-wide responsibilities. Operations support instruction is addressed to DD/S and DD/P requirements. Intelligence production courses deal with the needs of professional employees in the DD/I. The School contributes a major portion of the initial ten weeks of headquarters training of JOT's and is exclusively responsible for the subsequent twelve weeks of training in intelligence production provided to that segment of the JOT's who are designated to go to the DD/I. Thus the School has contact with virtually every new employee of the Agency, in many cases in advance of his acquaintance with his working supervisors.

2. No other school in OTR is faced with more elusive problems than those with which the Intelligence School must deal. Where training in skills has been involved, its staff has proceeded with confidence and general efficiency. In the areas of employee orientation, management skills and intelligence production, however, there has been limited consensus as to what was to be done and the OTR effort has been subject to constant adjustment. The principal problems facing the school are discussed in detail below.

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3. Orientation of any audience diverse in age, grade and profession is a difficult undertaking without introducing the complication peculiar to CIA of security limitations on description of complex and interesting activities. There are two obvious objectives in orientation -- to provide motivation and to impart certain general facts about an organization. There are ever present dangers of superficiality and boredom in brief treatment of orientation subjects. There is no effective measure of results. CIA now provides separate orientation series for its clericals, its JOT's and for all other professional employees, GS-7 and above, entering the Agency. The principal exemptions from Agency orientation are operators recruited by the Office of Communications and employees in very sensitive positions.

4. With the JOT program now undergoing major expansion as the principal supplier of professional manpower to the Agency, various questions have been raised about the orientation training appropriate to a declining EOD population of non-JOT's. There is desire to economize on instructor staff and on the time of senior officials who make up the large roster of guest lecturers employed. The Basic Orientation Course for non-JOT's has just recently been reduced from four to three weeks, consisting of one week of general orientation and two weeks on Communism. Guest lectures have been taped and transcribed in order to experiment with heavier use of reading materials. This approach is perfectly reasonable so long as the attendant risk is recognized and guarded against. Motivation by impersonal means is apt to be far more difficult to achieve than by face-to-face lectures and discussions with the leaders of the Agency.

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Secondly, the Agency must scrupulously avoid any suggestion that the non-JOT is a second-class citizen to be segregated in all respects, including training, from the JOT elite. Rather, he must be given every inducement to upgrade the role he plays and to rise by demonstrated excellence to top rank, particularly through opportunity to qualify for JOT training.

5. There is a further aspect of orientation, namely, written communication, in which the Agency's practice departs from that of most large organizations. For reasons of security few of the usual devices for staff communication, including employee publications, newsletters, annual reports, employee manuals and bulletin boards covering employment opportunities and other Agency business, are put to general use by CIA to motivate and integrate its employees into the organization. There is no way of determining what this costs the Agency in quality of service and in employee turnover. The entire field merits new study including the possibility of revision and reissue of the 1952 brochure "Your Job in the Central Intelligence Agency."

6. In management and supervision training the principal problem is the relatively embryonic state of development of the subject anywhere -- in government, in private business and in the universities. Handling of people is, first of all, an art, not a science. In addition, CIA with its brief history of extremely rapid growth, youthful staff and evolving mission does not yet afford settled patterns from which to derive a management doctrine. In this situation management training must employ instructors who have a record of successful administration of operations and it must reach today's managers as well as those showing potential for the future.

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Up to the present time the record of participation by managers in management training has been rather poor. The DD/P, in particular, with major inherent problems in staff communication, has participated least, having enrolled, for example, 42 out of 216 taking management courses in 1958 and 1959, of which only nine attended during the latter year. The Agency's senior managers, with some notable exceptions, simply have not been convinced that they or their staffs require special management training to perform their jobs efficiently. Many of those who would concede that such training could be of benefit are dubious about the content of the present instruction.

7. There is evidence enough of deficient management practice in the Agency, even though the Agency's over-all performance has undoubtedly improved with increasing maturity. There would of course continue to be cases of deficient practice were all managers formally trained in management techniques and policy. The Agency, however, has yet to take a firm position on the need for such training in preparing its executive personnel to exercise their responsibilities. The experience of the Department of State suggests what may lie ahead for CIA on its present course. Only in 1956 and under strongest pressure did the Department finally launch a plan for mid-career training for its Foreign Service Officers of ranks 3, 4 and 5, to run twelve weeks and to include two weeks devoted to case studies in executive management.

8. The problem with respect to instruction in intelligence for the DD/I professional intelligence officer is once again a lack of consensus on what is needed. The problem is discussed in greater detail at

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a later point in this survey in connection with the training of economists. The DD/I offices to date have generally denied need for such training. Certain courses in intelligence research techniques have been developed by OTR but enrollments have been insignificant. Courses in effective speaking, writing and conference leadership, which, in general, have limited bearing on substantive competence, have been offered but in the face of the very grave doubt that the deficiencies should have been tolerated during recruitment and apprenticeship. Again it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this training in the context of the many elements which determine the individual's over-all performance on the job. Be this as it may, courses which instruct all performers, strong or weak, in preferred techniques would appear to be on considerably safer ground than those which are purely remedial in character.

9. Training in intelligence for DD/I professionals can and must achieve a better rationale than aid for the marginal performer. A way is open if the DD/I will agree to recruitment of the bulk of his junior officer requirement through a truly Agency-wide JOT system and if he will send his best qualified officers to cooperate with the Office of Training on a continuing basis in the design and evaluation of the JOT course content. As the Agency matures, mid-career and senior officer training will be essential to assure a breadth of vision in intelligence complementing that which the DD/I professional will obtain in his special field through sabbaticals and through continuing activity in outside professional associations. The content of this training need not be unpalatable to DD/I personnel for it has the precedence of the senior staff colleges for the

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military and there is an unending array of cross-disciplinary problems on which the intelligence researcher must be challenged to think constructively.

10. Clerical training raises a host of questions for which there are no simple answers. The basic factor determining present CIA clerical training policy is the difficult market for clerical staff. The Agency has a large requirement for clerical support overseas and out of its own and State Department experience has reached the conclusion that clerical employees under 21 years of age are apt to be too immature to adjust satisfactorily to the living conditions and work pressures of overseas assignments. This limitation and its high standards in recruitment generally throw the Agency into the competition for the highest quality personnel on the market. There are, of course, many other complications, including salary competition and high living costs plus difficult living conditions in the headquarters area. The most important additional factor is the 25X9 Agency's large-scale employment of young women who are marriageable or, if married, contribute a major element of the attrition rate by reason of childbearing. CIA recruited in excess of clerical personnel during 1959 and could expect according to current experience to have the average clerical employee resign after only 18 months of service.

11. The initial location and screening of clerical candidates for employment is performed by CIA field recruiters. These men look in particular to the heads of responsible commercial training schools for leads on desirable candidates. Applicants are required to take United States Employment Service proficiency tests wherever possible, where this is not feasible the testing may be waived until EOD on presentation of

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certification of proficiency by a high school or commercial training institution. Such certification unfortunately has frequently proved to be unreliable. The recruiters themselves present and score a test worked out by OTR's Assessment and Evaluation Staff covering basic aptitudes and personality factors. About 80 per cent of all candidates are rejected in the present period for poor test scores and other deficiencies. The long wait for security clearance is a factor at this point in holding desirable candidates and the Office of Personnel has found it necessary from 1948 forward to bring about half of its clerical recruits on duty in an interim assignment pool in advance of clearance.

12. Up to this point the Agency has exercised options on the rigorousness of its testing and the decision to EOD in advance of full clearance. It is perhaps inevitable that the recruiters, the clerical trainers and the consumers differ on the policies involved. The trainers understandably hope to start with personnel of high proficiency, instead they frequently meet up with recruits who fail to demonstrate their certified qualifications. The recruiters, with intimate knowledge of the market and in view of the high CIA attrition rate, question the need and results of the A&E testing and the, to them, unrealistic rate of rejection of candidates. Both parties attest to the frequent waste of quality personnel in inadequate assignments. An off-the-cuff estimate is that eight out of ten secretaries with shorthand make little or no use of their skill because their executives do not dictate their correspondence.

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13. The clerical faculty offers instruction in typing, shorthand, English usage, and geography. A three-day Agency orientation is provided for clericals cleared for office duty. A packet of these courses is provided at induction for individuals awaiting clearance. The average length of training at this point is three weeks, the range is from one to five weeks. A second packet of courses is provided as refresher instruction for individuals seeking to qualify for more responsible assignments, or

	This training runs

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20 - 30 hours part-time.

14. In summary, clerical training must be weighed in the broader context of clerical recruitment, job assignment, utilization and attrition. Must the Agency hire employees who require extensive training in typing and shorthand immediately following entrance on duty? Does the A&E testing applied to clerical candidates justify itself in the light of present-day attrition rates? Are the recruiters reaching segments of the market less subject to attrition due to marriage and childbearing? What portion of clerical loss is due to waste of talent in low quality assignments? The evidence on these matters must be regularly reassessed.

It is recommended that:

The Director of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the over-all problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program.

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C. Operations School

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1. Introduction

a. The Operations School has the principal responsibility in OTR for training of professional personnel for the Clandestine Services. It is composed of four programs including headquarters and field training [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

training are discussed in detail in subsequent sections of this survey. The Overseas Training Staff has support rather than instructional responsibilities and is concerned with the provision of training materials and the selection and training of instructors for Agency and foreign liaison projects overseas. Its role in providing training materials is described in connection with the discussion of training doctrine in the section dealing with [REDACTED] 25X1

b. The Headquarters Training Staff is responsible for training in clandestine operations. The JOT, for example, after graduation from basic intelligence training, will receive further specialized training in operations from this staff. It is the principal point of contact between operating divisions and staffs in the DD/P and the Office of Training for the development and execution of new courses reflecting the experience and changing needs of the DD/P. It draws heavily on the DD/P for instructors and guest lecturers and works closely with the Overseas Training Staff and DD/P personnel in the development and testing of training materials.


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c. Courses offered by the Headquarters Training Staff in 1960 include:

Clandestine Services Review
Covert Action Operations
Clandestine Services Liaison Operations
Clandestine Scientific and Technical Operations
Counterintelligence Operations
Counterintelligence Familiarization

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Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements,
Information Reports Familiarization
Cable Writing Refresher


d. Veteran DD/P personnel will make most of the contacts they may have with OTR through this Staff and the courses listed above. They frequently will possess practical knowledge of the subject being taught and their judgments of the training will be promptly and candidly stated. They object most frequently to what they consider to be the excessive length of these courses and their inflexible scheduling. The average man in a line assignment insists that he cannot break away for longer than a week at a time for full-time training and that, preferably, he should be offered part-time courses so that he can attend to his job part of each day. There is a fairly strong preference stated for short seminars which will bring people of comparable experience and qualifications together for a useful exchange of ideas.

e. Headquarters Training competes directly with priority operating programs for the time of DD/P personnel. The DD/P has not yet made it mandatory that an employee have formal training in a given field before operating in that field. The inevitable tendency of the operational program to win out combined with the employee's scepticism about his need for training, produce poor

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enrollments, frequent cancellations and underemployment of instructional staff. These issues are noted throughout this survey and provide the basis for some of the principal recommendations presented in the final section. The Headquarters Training Staff can and does modify its courses under constructive criticism but this is of limited consequence to the extent that the operator learns on the job and dispenses with formal training.



(3) The major portion of the basic training program for the Clandestine Services, and in particular for junior officer trainees under the JOTP, was transferred from headquarters early in 1953. This

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duty, however, there appear to be distinct limits to the necessary motivation growing out of the individual's concern for his subsequent career and his fear of a gradual loss of touch with "reality". Tours will be extended only through career planning that assures each man a reasonable next assignment in place of the present "hunting license" to enter the market and fend for himself.

(3) The instructor rotation pattern is not sufficiently staggered at the present time. In consequence, the problems of recruitment, training and continuity of program have been unreasonably concentrated in several recent years. A minimum solution based on orderly career planning procedures in the DD/P would be a three year tour with a turnover of one-third of the teaching staff annually.

f. Training Doctrine

(1) The question of what to teach has been unusually perplexing for a new organization in a new field of peacetime governmental activity. The basic responsibility for what is customarily termed "training doctrine" clearly lies with the operating offices of the Agency and not with the Office of Training. Present OTR understanding of the concept is summarized in TAB A of the OTR Emergency, Contingency, and War Plan, 15 February 1960, as follows:

"Training Doctrine: Doctrine [consists of] principles and policies applicable to a subject which have been developed through experience or theory, that represent the best available thought, and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice. It is the responsibility of the operating components to develop and forward to OTR such doctrine as they desire taught to their personnel."

(2) There is no fulltime staff of professional intelligence officers charged with the development of CIA or Directorate training doctrine. The DD/I with its pronounced orientation towards the academic professions has

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not yet come to grips with the issue of training in intelligence for its professional specialists. The DD/S shares some of the DD/I motivation by virtue of its requirements for specialists such as lawyers and engineers which it expects to satisfy by hiring ready trained individuals in the market, but with respect to training in intelligence it generally reflects the attitudes and practices of the DD/P. The DD/P, finally, has not reached a stage where it could justify centralized management of this segment of its responsibilities, and instead has left the matter to its subordinate commands, in particular the senior staffs, to execute as each has seen fit. A considerable amount of doctrinal material has been generated in the DD/P over the years. On the other hand, there are large numbers of project files throughout the DD/P containing significant operational experience, often in subject fields for which no formal training is yet provided, which have never been exploited for training purposes. Some courses concentrate on World War II cases, classics of their kind, for lack of the time and professional judgment required to develop more recent cases for instructional use. No component office in the DD/P claims that it has made more than a beginning on the problem of distilling and recording the doctrine of its operations.

(3) The ramifications of the problem are far-reaching.

Operating responsibilities leave little time for experienced officers to study such matters. The DD/P, generally speaking, is still in the first generation of commanders so that many men at branch chief level and above have had only limited contact if any with Agency training programs and problems. The Agency has yet to evolve mid-career and senior executive training which will invite analysis of the roles of chiefs of station, and of branches, and which will

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assemble experienced individuals in the manner of the military staff colleges to dissect, compare, and evaluate operating experience.

(4) Perhaps the principal source of DD/P doctrine today is the operations officer detailed to OTR as an instructor and the contribution he makes in revising inherited training materials to reflect his own judgment and experience. A second source is the DD/P lecturer, a regular feature of many OTR courses. A third source is the DD/P project entailing special training of participants and the development of specially tailored training materials. Against these normal and positive factors, however, must be set the testimony available today from many quarters of offers or identification of project files suitable for training purposes which have not been exploited for lack of time to do the job.

(5) Deficiencies in the development of doctrine are not to be attributed to the Office of Training. If anything, that Office has had to exceed its proper limits to develop instructional materials for its courses. The record of OTR has been excellent in suggesting subjects for treatment, in eliciting the cooperation of individuals in operating offices to develop course content and in offering the end product to the appropriate operating office for certification. The educational methods staff in OTR has contributed significantly to the orderly development of textual materials. The OTR war planning activity has specified the systematic development and deposit of course materials in safe locations against emergency need. Students have been encouraged wherever possible to work on live problems so that the end product will have training potential in the future. In its Overseas Training Staff (Operations School), OTR has evolved a clearinghouse and publishing center with the most complete library of operations

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"doctrinal" publications available in the Agency. The basic mission of this Staff enables it to obtain current knowledge of the preparation of doctrinal materials throughout the Agency. From this it has been a short step to collaboration on projects, reference service and editorial assistance to DD/P offices and to instructors [] as well as to programs overseas. Unfortunately, the present scope of the activity is not widely publicized because of the security limitations on general announcement and dissemination of training materials associated with sensitive projects. This aspect of the activity is in need of re-evaluation so that useful materials will not stand idle for lack of knowledge of their existence.

(6) It is obvious that both operating offices and training command have important roles to play in the development of doctrine. A basic lack in present-day operations is provision for the analysis of projects for historical and doctrinal purposes. Where a project at termination is judged to have major doctrinal implications, one of its senior officers might well be detailed to an OTR Training Doctrine Staff for a sufficient period to organize, evaluate and sterilize the project files for training purposes. The capabilities of the Staff should include the best information handling practices so that bibliographies and indexes will be regularly developed and their existence made known to the professional personnel of the Agency.

(7) There is a further aspect of the doctrine problem which concerns the open literature on intelligence and espionage. The Agency has been engaged for some years in the development of a definitive library of intelligence in its Historical Intelligence Collection housed in the Office of Central Reference/DD/I. At least one instance was discovered of an instructor []

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who was unaware of the existence of the collection. Since completion of a bibliography of the collection lies some distance in the future, its Curator and appropriate officials in OTR should collaborate on the development of an appropriate working collection of open literature [redacted] and effective publicizing of the existence and potential usefulness of the parent collection at headquarters.

g. Present State of the Training Curriculum

(1) The content and balance of the curriculum now offered [redacted] reflects the current situation in training 25X1 doctrine. There is marked instability in content, scheduling, and enrollment.

(2) Various operating offices have experimented with permissive job standards outlining minimum formal training judged desirable for various basic categories of assignments. Thus far, however, these have had relatively limited effect in determining who receives what training preparatory to a given assignment.

(3) [redacted], where the enrollment of JOT's for basic training is controlled, curriculum problems include: (a) insufficient time to fit tradecraft and more specialized operations training into a crowded schedule, and (b) concern that the benefits of training will be lost before the individual has opportunity to apply them in practice, or that the content is meaningless until he gains operating experience. Many operating officials express the opinion that the [redacted] curriculum still does not train in investigative technique [redacted] to the degree of proficiency that should be required of any case officer. The students themselves testify that tradecraft training [redacted] [redacted], for example, is substantially lost over the intervening two years before overseas assignment.

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(4) The junior officer graduating [] faces a sizeable and growing list of advanced training courses as well as the formidable demands of language and area training limited only by the specialization dictated by his first assignment. At the present time JOT's, both in apprentice status and permanently assigned to operating offices, comprise less than 10 per cent of the total DD/P professional personnel for whom the advanced operations courses have been designed. Yet given both JOT and non-JOT sources of possible demand for training these courses have not drawn and are not drawing sufficient enrollments to sustain themselves. The typical pattern for any new course has been a mildly coerced adequate enrollment for the first presentation, then a steady decline with intermittent cancellations when student numbers have been too small to promise reasonable classroom discussion or to justify tying up training instructors and facilities. OTR officials cited eight situations of this kind in a memorandum on the subject in December 1958. The Chief Instructor for Headquarters Operations Training reported in May of this year that there had been no improvement in the intervening eighteen months.

(5) The explanations of DD/P line officers concerning low enrollments are varied. Considerable scepticism is expressed about training for training's sake. The present generation of executives has had minimum formal training and believes firmly in learning on-the-job under experienced senior officers. Many believe that the training of their subordinates is now reaching the saturation point and that small enrollments are inevitable. Operational priorities and current ceilings on manpower cause many branch chiefs to insist that they cannot release individuals for training without increase in T/O for that purpose. There is some opinion, but no consensus, that sanctions will be

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required, such as those now being experimented with in the Foreign Service, to solve the enrollment problem. These may include a more powerful central personnel management to oversee personnel assignment decisions, the development and enforcement of job standards, and a policy that makes promotion contingent on satisfaction of training requirements. 25X1

(6) The problem derives in part from faulty communication between the authorities concerned. The line command will not acquire indoctrination in the values of formal training without more awareness of training programs and policies. Confidence in the curriculum and reasonable enrollments will not appear overnight and certainly cannot be achieved by decree. OTR has briefed parties of line commanders on [] activities in the past but the contacts have been too brief and intermittent. In spite of all of the hazards of bureaucratic procedure, OTR should experiment with the concept of Boards of Overseers composed of senior grade officers from the Directorates rotated to the assignment for relatively brief periods of three to six months, who will meet regularly with the training management and faculty for detailed briefings and project investigation of current problems. The problem is one of leadership and it rests with the Director of Training and the Deputy Directors of the Agency. 25X1

h. The Future of Paramilitary Training

(1) The faculties [] which are concerned with paramilitary training moved to standby status shortly following the end of the Korean War. Emphasis changed from the training of active participants in paramilitary operations to the indoctrination of case officers in the potential of PM so that they could recognize possible applications and call in the experts to perform detailed planning and execution.

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(2) In 1959 the DD/P through the CA Staff conducted an intensive review of the whole subject of unconventional warfare which led to the conclusions that its PM capabilities surviving from the Korean War period were rapidly disappearing and that there was need for a standby PM capability consisting of professional staff, normally employed in regular DD/P assignments, but qualified through special training to compose task forces as needed to organize, train for

[REDACTED]

(3) Out of this review there has since been developed the concept of a Contingency Force numbering several hundred individuals to be trained or refreshed by formal courses and annual maneuvers, regularly certified as physically and mentally fit for PM duty, and regularly reinforced with new blood by the training of select JOT volunteers in a three-months postgraduate PM course

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(4) It is not possible at this date, following the first maneuver held in May and preceding the first training of JOT's which begins in August, to evaluate the prospects of the program. There are the usual uncertainties concerning possible erosion of skills from lack of use, and the likelihood that the line divisions in a live situation will prefer to train other staff for such purposes because of their command positions and superior knowledge of the given area and the operational problems involved. The future of paramilitary training and of the contingency force concept will require review at a later date.

It is recommended that:

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(a) DTP adopt for headquarters administrative and career planning purposes a designation [REDACTED] that adequately reflects the scope and purpose of this intelligence training center.

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(b) DTR adopt a three-year tour of duty as standard practice for instructors and schedule replacement at the rate of one-third of the instructor staff annually.


(c) DTR redesignate his Overseas Training Staff to better reflect its expanding function as a clearing house for training doctrine; that its role as a depository and an editorial and coordination staff be negotiated with the Directorates and publicized, including preparation and dissemination of bibliographies under the various security limitations that may apply.

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(d) Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, collaborate with Chief, Operations School/OTR, to develop and publicize a working collection of open intelligence literature [redacted] which will fully reflect the existence and capabilities of the principal collection at headquarters.

(e) DTR experiment with the concept of a board of overseers composed of senior grade professional officers as a means to improved communication with and indoctrination of consumers, and to promote the development of more effective policies on curriculum and enrollment.


(f) The DD/P establish in his office a position of DD/P Training and Doctrine Officer having responsibility and authority for the formulation and implementation of Clandestine Service training policy and the development of operational doctrine.



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4. Military Reserve Officer Training

a. Origin

(1) The training of military reservists is a basic responsibility of the military services and, in general, is beyond the purview of this survey. Agency employees with active military reserve officer status are required to devote a certain amount of their own time to military study in order to maintain that status and to advance within their service. The Agency is required only to grant leave to the reservist for 15 days each year so that he may

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participate in an active duty training program of his choice. The reservist has a wide variety of programs to choose from and there is little doubt that the individual and the Agency frequently derive benefit from this activity. 25X1

(2) In 1957 the Military Personnel Division, Office of Personnel, proposed an Agency sponsored program which would permit reservists to perform their 15 day active duty training [redacted] The purpose was to related such training more closely to the Agency's wartime mission and the unconventional warfare courses offered by OTR would evolve into a logical extension of the already established program conducted at the weekly meetings of the Reserve. Permission was requested of the military services in April 1958 to use the OTR courses in UW to meet the active duty tour for reservists. The Army and Air Force concurred but Navy and Marine Corps refused because the program did not meet their training requirements. 25X1

25X1 (3) Arrangements were made with the Office of Training to conduct four courses; [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] Each course was of two weeks duration and for the balance of 1958 were scheduled a total of seven times. OTR found favor with the program partly, at least, because staff officer requirements for UW training were at low ebb and it offered a means of maintaining a training capability acknowledged to be important but which otherwise could hardly be justified. OTR stipulated, however, that Reserve training would be subordinate to regularly scheduled operations training including tutorials and special exercises. It also was subject to the availability of instructor personnel. The Military Reserve Officer Training Program [redacted] was launched on 2 June 1958 with the opening of the first course [redacted]

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b. Current Activities

(1) Since the program started a total of [] (of more than [] eligible) Army and Air Force reservists have elected to take the OTR courses [] as their active duty training. One running of the [] in February 1960 was cancelled for lack of applicants but all others have been well attended. The last course to be scheduled for CY 1960 began 11 July; thereafter for the balance of the year all Reserve Officer Training Courses will be suspended because of the press of other requirements.

(2) The value of the program both to the individual reservist and the Agency is difficult to appraise. Two weeks of practical field work and demonstrations would appear to be a logical climax to the 40 weekly two-hour sessions of instruction in UW operations the reservist receives throughout the rest of the year. The program must be weighed in the light of the overall contribution it makes to the Agency in preparing for its responsibilities to support the armed forces in time of war. From this point of view some serious doubts emerge.

(3) It should be noted at the outset that the Agency's wartime role is not clearly delineated, that there is not universal agreement on the nature and extent of the Agency's mission in time of hot war and that Unconventional Warfare is only one aspect of its mission. To place undue emphasis on UW is to distort the whole picture. A very sound three-year cycle of instruction for Agency reservists was approved by the Command Group in 1956 to study major military forces of the world. Under this program UW as a subject for study assumes an appropriate but relatively low level position.

(4) If it is intended, as has been implied, to prepare reservists to participate in UW operations in time of war this program is entirely inadequate.

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Unconventional Warfare is a highly specialized field requiring extensive training in depth not merely in the four courses conducted [] but of the full scope of clandestine and covert operations. It is a subject in which superficial knowledge is far more dangerous than total ignorance. Furthermore the needs of the Clandestine Service for officers capable of conducting paramilitary operations must be met through a program designed for the purpose and having more specific objectives in view. The DD/P has recently approved such a program in connection with the establishment of the Contingency Task Force.

(5) The training facilities [] are not able to meet the requirements of both the Contingency Task Force and the Officer Reserve active duty program and the latter will be suspended with the completion of the course scheduled to begin 11 July 1960. Such suspension is in keeping with the priority status of the Contingency Task Force program and if there are plans to re-institute the Officer Reserve program at some time in the future they have not yet been made known. In view of the obscure objectives and questionable contribution made by the Officer Reserve active duty training program it must be regarded more as a convenience than a necessity and therefore its continuation is not justified.

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It is recommended that:

The DTR confer with the Commanding Officers of the Army and Air Reserve units to see if more practical reserve training, e.g., International Communism, could be handled by OTR for the reservists.

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D. School of International Communism

1. Three courses are offered by the School of International Communism (SIC):

Introduction to Communism, 80 hours full time, provides basic instruction in Communist ideology and the International Communist movement. It is designed to meet the needs of all professional employees of the Agency.

Communist Party Organization and Operations, 80 hours part time, provides a practical working knowledge of the structure and activities of Communist Parties outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is available to all intelligence officers although patronized most by those engaged in clandestine operations.

Anti-Communist Operations, 80 hours part time, includes the planning and conduct of clandestine operations against Communist Parties and is offered exclusively to DD/P personnel.

2. In addition to these programmed courses the School conducts a somewhat compressed version of all three courses for the JOT program. There are heavy demands made for tutorial training principally of contract agents and the School has on occasion developed tailor-made courses to meet the requirements of individual components.

3. The faculty consists of seven instructors all of whom are OTR careerists. All are well qualified for their assignments and having longer tenure than the average they profit from continuity of instruction from class to class and are able to develop a depth of knowledge of their subjects to an unusual degree. Several of them are much in demand as

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lecturers at other intelligence schools. The staff is augmented by operations officers principally provided by CI Staff to give instruction in the Anti-Communist Operations course.

4. Doctrine presents no problem for School of International Communism. There is a wealth of substantive material flowing in from several sources of which one of the best is International Communism Division, CI Staff. Finished intelligence publications as well as raw information reports are received and reviewed and the only problem is one of keeping abreast of current knowledge and thinking about the Communist movement. Operational doctrine on neutralizing and countering Communist Party activities is neither as voluminous nor as well developed. It is, however, adequate for training purposes at the present level.

5. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the School's training, solicited from consumers and trainees alike, rates the courses extremely high. The School is acknowledged to be superior to university courses on International Communism (a) because of the inclusion of much classified material usually not available to academic institutions and (b) because its courses are designed for intelligence service use. Instruction is described as concise, hard-hitting and most effective.

6. The School is of major importance to the Agency's training effort. It gives definition and purpose to the Agency's mission by identifying and describing the menace and motives of International Communism against the free world. It contributes largely to the motivation of intelligence officers, particularly the junior members, and should

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become an essential element of the basic training required of all officers regardless of their assignments to collection, production or support components.

7. The only problem of major significance to the School is the heavy drain on manpower to meet requirements for tutorial training. Such training is unpredictable, difficult to schedule, and, for security reasons, impossible to conduct on a classroom basis. On a larger scale this problem affects all of OTR and some suggestions for relieving the condition are offered in a subsequent section of this report.

It is recommended that:

The courses on International Communism be given wider publicity and offered to the personnel of other agencies.

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E. Language & Area School

1. Introduction

a. Recognizing the essential role that foreign language skills play in the pursuit of the Agency's mission, Regulation entitled "Language Development Program," lays a clear mandate on certain key officials to develop the necessary capability. In brief, the program calls for the determination of requirements for foreign language competence and prescribes action for training Agency personnel to meet those requirements. The regulation assigns responsibility to the Deputy Directors to establish the requirements and to assure the continuing attainment and retention of foreign language proficiency by staff personnel under their jurisdiction. The heads of Career Services and Operating Officials are to direct or encourage their employees to engage in language study and the Director of Training is to exercise general direction of the program. He is to provide for directed and voluntary language training in approved courses and programs, establish standards and proficiency tests, and to administer the monetary Achievement and Maintenance Awards. The Director of Personnel is directed to maintain a current inventory of the language competences of staff personnel. The Regulation further provides that a five-man Committee for Language Development, consisting of one representative each of the three Deputy Directors and of the Offices of Training and Personnel, shall recommend and periodically review policies, procedures and other matters affecting the program, including language awards.

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b. The various arrangements that have been worked out to implement the program for formal language training may be summarized as follows: (a) the Office of Training, through its Language and Area School (IAS), currently offers instruction in 18 languages; (b) use is made of the training facilities of other Federal agencies, chiefly those of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), where in FY 1959, 32 Agency employees received language training; (c) recourse is also had to the language courses offered by universities and colleges and to the tutorial instruction available at the Berlitz School and Sanz School; (d) the Agency's Voluntary Language Training Program, described below, provides opportunity for off-duty hours group instruction in approximately 20 languages; (e) finally, Agency personnel stationed abroad generally have an opportunity for further formal language training at their posts.

c. Various factors influence the choice among these facilities in each individual case. Accessibility and security considerations in the avoidance of disclosure of identities of Clandestine Services personnel are best secured at Agency facilities. The widest range of languages (28 currently offered, with capability of 40) is to be found at Foreign Service Institute. The most concentrated training (so-called "24-hour" use) is offered at the Army Language School at Monterey and at

25X1 The availability of the employee for only part-time training, the cost of tuition, transportation and maintenance of the employee and his family or, on the other hand, the cost and difficulty of providing coverage of a new language at Language and Area School also

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are taken into consideration. Other basic factors are the comparative excellence of instruction and the difficulty of the individual language. For illustration, while some of the western languages can be learned in a matter of months, two years of concentrated work under the most favorable conditions are required for Chinese, Japanese and Korean. Frequently, the date of availability of the trainee and date of the beginning of a given language course exercise influence in the choice.

2. Organization & Activities

a. Language and Area School consists of 25 staff personnel (19 of professional grade; six clericals) and 24 contract employees (native speakers of various languages). It is organized in three "faculties": Language, Area Knowledge and Research and Administrative. The Language faculty comprises four "Departments": for Germanic, Romance, Slavic and Eastern European, and Asian and African languages respectively. The small Area Knowledge faculty is divided along geographical lines.

b. At the time of this survey, the School was giving full-time or part-time instruction, during duty hours, in these 18 languages:

French	Russian
Spanish	Polish
Italian	Czech
Rumanian	Serbo-Croat
German	
Swedish	Japanese
Norwegian	Chinese
Greek	Arabic
	Persian
	Turkish
	Hungarian

c. Instruction in several further languages, including Swahili, Armenian, and Finnish, was available in the Agency's Voluntary Language Training

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program. In general, the courses given by the school are comprehensive, aiming at proficiency in reading, writing and speaking. The method of instruction employed is the combined use of native speakers (instructors) for speaking and drill, and instruction in grammar and structure of the language from the respective department head, who is a linguistic scientist and who also guides the instructor in the best methods of teaching that particular language to English-speaking students.

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e. For the proper evaluation of these language-training figures a sharp distinction must be drawn between the various types of training. In the nature of the difficult process of learning a foreign language, it is only the directed full-time course that provides the best conditions for progress. The directed part-time course, occupying half of the working day and leaving the trainee immersed in his regular job the other half of the day, is objectionable to the linguists because it is considerably less effective and much more time consuming. The principle of part-time training is accepted

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by Language & Area School only as a compromise in order to accommodate employees who cannot be released from their desks full-time. Of all Government agencies, only CIA and NSA offer part-time language courses. The voluntary training program stands still further down the scale, as it consists of time donated by the trainee outside his full work-day, namely one hour of group work a day under a non-professional instructor, supplemented by five hours of individual work a week in the language laboratory on language tapes or other material.

f. The tabulation on the following page presents a concrete picture of the total number of Agency staff employees who were receiving training in various languages as of 1 May 1960.

3. The Voluntary Language Training Program

a. The Agency's Voluntary Language Training Program was started in 1957 to provide employees at Headquarters with an opportunity to receive instruction in language study without expense outside of regular duty hours. Under the supervision of Language & Area School, instructors for this program were sought from among Agency employees (largely from the DD/P) who possessed a high degree of competence in a given foreign language and who wishes to conduct a group fellow-colleagues desirous of studying that language. Such instructors receive as compensation payment at overtime rates. The average compensation is \$4.38 an hour. These voluntary instructors were given some coaching by School instructors in the techniques of teaching a language. Classes for small groups were established as requested, being held in various convenient places in Agency buildings either at 7:30 a.m. or at 5:15 p.m. In the first two and a half years of the program, that is, by 1 March 1960, the following results were obtained: a roster of instructors was built

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	LAS			EXTERNAL	
	Full-Time	Part-Time	Tutorial	Full-Time	Part-Time
Arabic	9 students (2 Basic courses)	5 students (Basic course)	2 students	2 (1 at Col. U; 1 at Georgetown)	5 (2 at Georgetown; 3 with private tutor)
Chinese	8 students (5 Basic, 3 Advanced)	4 students (Basic II)	2 students	2 (1 at FSI—Washington 1 at FSI—Formosa)	1 (FSI)
French	4 students (Intermediate course)	16 students (6 Basic I, 6 Basic III, 4 Interm. II)	11 students	7 (5 at FSI, elem. 1 at Georgetown 1 at Sanz)	1 (priv. tutor elem.)
German	8 students (Intermediate course)	24 Students (8 Basic I, 7 Basic II, 7 Reading II, 2 Interm. Sem.)	7 students	1 (1 at FSI, elem.)	...
Greek	...	9 students (4 Basic I, 3 Basic II, 2 Interm. I)
Hungarian	...	2 students (Workshop-Reading)
Italian	...	2 students (Intermed. II)	9 students
Japanese	...	9 students (5 Basic II, 4 Intermed. II)	2 students	4 (1 Monterey elem. 3 FSI—Tokyo (2 elem. 1 int.)	2 (1 at Berlitz elem. 1 at Sanz elem.)
Norwegian	2 students
Persian	...	4 students (Familiarization)
Polish	...	7 students (4 Adv. Seminar, 3 Wkshop-Read.)	2 students	1 (Monterey elem.)	...
Portuguese	2 students	1 (FSI, elem.)	...
Romanian	...	3 students (Wkshop-Read.)
Russian	...	54 students* (9 RSW II** 4 RSW III 3 RSW Advanced 13 Basic Reading 2 Int. Seminar I 2 Int. Seminar II 5 Adv. Seminar I 5 Adv. Seminar II 3 Int. Reading (Science & Tech.) II 5 Int. Reading (Econ. & Pol.) II 3 USSR-Int. Area & L. II)	1	...	3 (1 at Georgetown, adv. 1 at Berlitz, elem. 1 Priv. T. adv.)
Serbo-Croatian	...	3 students (Basic Read. II)	...	1 (FSI, elem.)	...
Spanish	...	3 students (Basic Read.)	3 students	1 (Berlitz, elem.)	...
Swedish	2 students
Turkish	...	12 students (7 Basic I, 4 Basic II, 1 Intermed.)	...	1 (FSI, elem.)	...
Czech	1 (at FSI, elem.)	...
Indonesian	1 (at FSI, elem.)	...
Thai
Korean	2 (at FSI, elem.)	...
Icelandic	1 (Priv. Tut., elem.)
Malayan	1 (at Sanz elem.)
Totals	29 Full-Time	157 Part-Time	45 Tutorial	27 Full-Time	14 Part-Time

Recapitulation

Full-Time 56
Part-Time, including tutorials 216

* Of these 54, 9 were from DD/P area, including 6 from SR/Div.

** RSW indicates a "comprehensive" course, reading, speaking, writing.

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up, of whom [] had actually been used. On that date there were [] employees who were studying ten different languages in 46 classes. By that time, approximately [] employees (an almost equal number of men and women) had participated in a total of 20 languages.

b. Participation in the program was, of course, strongly stimulated by monetary awards for achievement and maintenance of proficiency in foreign languages. This program was established simultaneously with the voluntary language program by [] and provides for awards, varying in amount from \$25.00 to \$600.00 according to the level of proficiency attained or maintained and the degree of difficulty of the language studied.

c. A survey of the experience with the voluntary language program, conducted by the Language & Area School early in 1960, disclosed that there had been an excessive amount of diffusion; too many persons had merely taken a language long enough to acquire a smattering of it (and to obtain an award). In the first two years out of [] who completed a trimester, [] were the beginning grades, [] in the intermediate and only [] in the advanced grades. Furthermore, only 25 per cent of the total had studied a language other than French, German, Spanish or Russian. Out of [] who had studied one of the four Western languages (French, German, Spanish and Italian), only 12 or 15 had received assignments where they could use their new knowledge. Accordingly, the bases of the voluntary language program and of the Awards Program have recently been modified, in order to focus them more accurately along lines of Agency interest.

d. Since there was believed to be no Agency shortage in the four Western languages, the elementary level of these languages was eliminated

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from both programs. This change reflected the view that in order to get training at Agency expense the employee should choose a language in which there are shortages and which bear a relation to the person's future assignments or assignability. The result of these changes is that during the 21-week semester running from 7 March to 29 July, 1960, there were only ☐ students in the voluntary program studying ten languages. We are of the view that these changes were salutary, for such proliferation of language study is impressive only when viewed quantitatively and the cost of the two programs, in terms of money and of employee energy (though donated voluntarily at off-duty times) is not inconsiderable.

4. The New Tutorial Language Training Program

a. The Agency's recent experience with language training by tutorial lessons presents a vivid illustration of the evil results flowing from the failure of the DD/P area to establish language standards and to make adequate plans for the language training of the individual officer who is about to go overseas. Given the fact that it requires approximately 250 class hours for a student of average aptitude to achieve an elementary proficiency in one of the common languages, tutorial training, if relied on excessively, would require a very large tutorial staff. Reliance on commercial tutoring schools, such as the Berlitz School, presents security problems in many cases and is extremely expensive (\$5-6 per hour per student). These and other considerations caused the Agency to shift its policy, three or four years ago, of relying predominantly on tutorial training and to substitute as the standard method of training the current system of full-time and part-time class instruction. This new policy meant that tutorial training

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was to be restricted to exceptional situations, e.g., (a) in languages for which infrequent, sporadic requirements make the scheduling of regular classes uneconomical, e.g., Dutch, Polish, etc.; or (b) cases where covert training is required owing to security considerations that prohibit the individual from exposing his identity to other trainees.

b. This distinction has long been disregarded to a substantial extent by the DD/P branch chiefs in requesting language training for their people. Numerous requests for tutorial training have been based on the grounds that shortness of time or pressure of other duties did not permit the individual to be scheduled for a regular class. In many of these cases, the real reason for failure to place the individual in a regularly-scheduled class was bad planning or lack of understanding on the part of the branch chief of the importance of language training or of the amount of time required for proper study. The result was that the school's small staff, already heavily engaged in regular class instruction was subjected to an excessive work-load and increased recourse had to be had to outside tutoring. In the calendar year 1959, 42 individuals received tutorial training at Berlitz or Sanz Schools or from private tutors.

c. In order to alleviate these strains, Language and Area School in February 1960, instituted a new program for increasing its own tutorial strength at moderate cost by recruiting tutors from among those wives of staff employees who are native speakers of foreign languages. By 1 July 1960, this new program had developed to the point where a roster of about 40 such tutors, capable of tutoring in 18 different languages, had been developed, security clearances for some 31 had been obtained and the

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large number of 62 persons had received, or were then receiving, tutorial instruction for periods of varying length. The new tutors are paid at the average rate of \$3.00 to \$3.50 an hour. They receive coaching in instruction techniques from the staff and the level of excellence of their instruction is stated to be at least as good as that offered at the commercial tutoring schools, recourse to which has been largely eliminated by the new program. The estimated cost of the new program is \$27,000 a year.

d. Although the achievements of the new program are thus substantial, an analysis recently made of the first 59 of the cases handled under the new program disclosed that whereas four were in the category of covert training and 15 were in languages for which no other training opportunity existed except in commercial schools, the remaining 40 cases were in the four common languages (French, German, Italian and Spanish) and of these 23 were mere beginners in the language. There is no evidence that a few weeks of training prior to departure abroad has any effect in the development of an operationally useful proficiency in even the easier languages and hence, that little gain to the Agency can be expected in the 23 cases just mentioned. This result is of course traceable to the lack of mandatory standards of language competence. These considerations provide additional support for the general recommendations made later in this report for putting teeth into the Agency's language training policy, but on the specific point of cutting down on the abuse made in resorting to tutorial training instead of regular class instruction,

It is recommended that:

The DD/P instruct all supervisors to observe, in requesting language training, the principle that training in regular classes is the normal

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and most effective method, and that resort to tutorial training shall be had only in exceptional cases and where required by security considerations, unavoidable pressure of time, or other valid reason.

5. Evaluation

10-10 15 TIMES FIGURE?

a. Given the Agency's foreign intelligence mission, its size and the amount of annual attrition, the figures quoted earlier at once raise prima facie a doubt whether the Agency is fully discharging its responsibilities in the matter of developing and maintaining its language capabilities. A number of cases of failure to provide necessary language capability in the field have been observed. Thus, in the course of our survey of Near East Division at the end of 1959, a serious deficiency in language competence and only very superficial area knowledge was found at practically all posts in that area. At a number of posts in Arab-speaking lands, the station had not a single staff employee who spoke Arabic. In general, these conditions also had been found to exist in that area at the time of our 1957 Survey; thus no real improvement was noted in the course of three years. It should be stated, however, that in the fall of 1959 the DD/P learned of this situation and ordered that a suitable number of employees be sent at once to training in Arabic. It is significant that it required a high-level direction to achieve this improvement. 25X1

b. An evaluation of the adequacy of the Agency's effort in language training is severely hampered by the delay of the Deputy Directors, particularly the DD/P, in complying with the provisions of for establishing their respective language requirements and a dependable inventory of the language competence of their personnel based upon the objective test procedures administered by the Language and Area School.

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Thus, as of the beginning of 1960, only 25 per cent of Agency personnel claiming a language competence had taken the tests with the result that the Agency's voluminous roster of language competence of Agency personnel consisted, in approximately 75 per cent of the instances, solely of a statement of the individual employee's self-evaluation, as submitted by him in 1957. Recently, however, the heads of the three principal components have issued instructions to their employees to take the language tests and as a result the rate of testing has increased substantially. It should be mentioned that in February and April, 1960, the DD/I and the DD/S, respectively, concluded the preparation of detailed Surveys of the language requirements of the positions under their jurisdictions and that a survey of training requirements, including language training, is presently being conducted by three divisions of the DD/P area. The information being produced in the DD/P effort appears, however, to be related to the needs and desires of the individual employee rather than to the requirements of the position.

c. The following excerpts from a survey of language abilities of employees in the Agency as of 31 August 1959 illustrate the gap between the numbers of abilities claimed and abilities tested, respectively. The source was the Agency Language Roster. The survey shows the number of employees who have claimed any level of proficiency in a language, the number of tests taken in that language and, of those tested, the number with intermediate or high levels of ability.

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<u>LANGUAGE</u>	<u>CLAIMED</u>	<u>NO. OF TESTS</u>	<u>COMPREHENSIVE</u>		<u>SPECIALIZED</u>	
			Interm	High	Interm	High
					Read	Speak
Arabic, modern written						
Arabic, other (Syrian, Lebanese, Western, etc.)						
Chinese, Cantonese						
Chinese, Mandarin						
Japanese						
Korean						
Russian						

(The columns in the table above should be read individually, since the same person may appear in more than one category. In considering the foregoing figures, it should be kept in mind that a great many of those who have claimed abilities, but have never submitted to tests, do in fact possess the abilities claimed. LAS uses 70 per cent as a rule-of-thumb measure. It should also be kept in mind that these figures are Agency-wide figures, not broken down to show the numbers with reference to the individual area division presumably having the greatest operational need of abilities in a given language.)

d. The extremely small number of employees receiving language training is attributable to a number of interrelated causes:

(1) There appears to be a lack of true conviction on the part of many division chiefs and other line officers of the importance of language competence. There is often a feeling that "a good job can be done without foreign languages." This attitude of indifference is believed to be

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a carry-over from the mentality of OSS days and may have its original roots in the traditional American isolationism of post World War I days.* Two results flowed from this attitude: (a) efforts to make the Agency Regulation mandatory from the point of requiring language competence for prescribed positions did not overcome resistance based upon the "State's Rights" theory; (b) the senior officers did not press with sufficient energy for adequate language training for their subordinates.

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[REDACTED]

apathy towards foreign languages: our inability to communicate in anything but English stems from our traditional isolationism of post-World War I days, the paralyzing prejudice held by our intelligentsia that Americans are not gifted for languages, with the accompanying placid assumption that everyone should understand English. He points out that while in 1914 45% of high school students were enrolled in modern language courses, as late as 1954-55 there were barely 15 per cent, with over half of the nation's high schools not even offering a modern language. Another consequence of this attitude is that while the ideal time to initiate an individual into the mysteries of language is before adolescence, in the U.S. schools foreign languages make their first appearance long after the child has lost full capacity for them. [REDACTED] then points out that this generally dismal picture is relieved by certain bright spots, such as the passing of the National Defense Education Action (which authorized a total of \$887,000,000 to be utilized for a four-year program of development of science, mathematics and language training) and the calling of a number of conferences of national leaders in many fields for the purpose of coming to grips with the nation's language deficiencies. [REDACTED] concludes his article by recommending that teaching methods be modernized, particularly by stressing the actual use of the foreign tongue and by broadening the range of languages taught, and in other ways. He points out that progress towards a better understanding at the grassroots of the language problem in its relation to our international communication needs is resulting from the series of "citizens consultations" held in hundreds of U.S. communities under the sponsorship of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, as a result of which parents, educators and civic leaders have spear-headed drives to improve language facilities at the local level.

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(2) As with training generally the individual branch chiefs usually have the decisive voice in determining how much language training their people receive and, with smaller T/O's and personnel ceilings, there is nowadays a tendency for a branch chief to be extremely reluctant to release his man from the daily work of the unit for the prolonged absences required for effective language training. An incidental result is that in many cases the case officer is released for training so late before his departure for an overseas post, that his language training is too curtailed to be adequate. Thus, the major deterrent to adequate language training is the fact that for all practical purposes the program is still controlled from the branch level.

(3) There appears to be very little high-level advanced planning concerning language requirements, e.g., provision of competence in Chinese in anticipation of the increased Agency requirements that would result from a recognition of Communist China by the U.S.; likewise in connection with possible political developments in Africa beyond the immediate future.

(4) Policy as to the creation of area specialists and their assurance of an advancement comparable to that received by a generalist has not yet been clearly established. Case officers, therefore, have a fear that by becoming specialists they limit their own prospects for advancement. This attitude results in a reluctance to become a master of the extremely difficult languages such as Chinese, Japanese and Arabic. This condition focuses attention on the importance of clarification of the problem of area specialists.

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(5) With reference to the Russian language, a special attitude (a sort of "schizophrenia") has resulted from the peculiar position of SR Division which stations its personnel abroad in non-Bloc countries. These officers acquire the host country language in order to operate and they profess to find it sufficient even in dealing with Soviet nationals found there, since the latter are always trained in the local language. This attitude has resulted in SR Division attributing minor importance to learning Russian, as is evidenced by the fact that in 1959 only two Agency employees were taking full-time Russian courses.

e. There appears to be a real question whether the Agency's concept of language training -- as implemented by the line officials of the DD/P area -- has kept pace with the Agency's general maturing. There is a strong tendency to rest content with the present reservoir of personnel who are competent in the more difficult languages, and to overlook the fact that the supply of Americans having native fluency in foreign languages is drying up. The differentiation between a generalist and a language-area specialist has not been carried to its logical conclusion and implemented in terms of career-planning and long-term study. Evidence of coordination between language training and the prospective long-term developments in such areas of political explosiveness as Africa south of the Sahara is lacking. Certainly, the Agency's needs will never be fulfilled by the considerable number of employees who participate in short-term programs without ever reaching a functional level in writing, speaking or reading. We have grave doubts that the Agency's long-term world-wide communication needs are being adequately prepared for.

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f. We accordingly believe that intervention at the highest Agency level is required in order to secure effective handling of the problem of ensuring that Agency language competence will attain the proper levels required both by current needs and by probable future developments. There appears to be urgent need to make Agency policy statements more specific and more effective.

It is recommended that:

(1) DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be amended by adding new provisions (a) directing the Deputy Directors to identify the categories of employees for whom specified degrees of language proficiency are required and to tie these standards of proficiency into promotion practices, and (b) directing the Deputy Directors to identify those positions, or that proportion of positions, in each overseas station that may be filled only by individuals who possess, to the degree specified, the language commonly used in the general area of that station.

(2) DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be further amended to make language proficiency testing, according to Agency standards, mandatory for all employees who are required to have language skill.

(3) DD/P direct that in all long-range operational planning the implications with respect to possible radical change in requirements as to the nature or extent of language capabilities be carefully considered and that the conclusions reached be regularly and promptly communicated to the DTR.

(4) DD/P give clearer recognition to the necessity for developing in larger numbers than at the present rate linguistically qualified area specialists.

(5) The Deputy Directors take such measures as may be necessary to cause all staff employees under their jurisdiction who claim language competence to submit to the Office of Training tests at the earliest practicable moment.

(6) DD/P consider the advisability of placing directly on the division chiefs the responsibility for all scheduling of language training for personnel in the division and for monitoring the timely carrying out of the language training thus scheduled.

6. Area Knowledge Courses

a. Language and Area School has a small Area Training Staff, consisting of three professionals and a secretary, which, with the help of guest

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speakers drawn from the Agency at large, offers short, concentrated orientation courses on particular countries and geographical areas. The courses, called "Americans Abroad Orientations", are intended for personnel and their dependents who are about to go to the area or country for the first time. They vary in length from one to four days. At the present time, courses on 30 different countries and areas are available, including the Middle East, North Africa, Africa South of the Sahara and Southeast Asia. In each course, the area's geographical, political, sociological and economic characteristics are examined, the problems existing between that area and the United States are briefly analyzed and guidelines for living abroad and advice on getting along well with the inhabitants are given. Use is made of illustrative films and various papers, maps, booklets, etc., are distributed to each participant for study. 25X9

b. During the first six months of 1960, 40 such courses, covering a total of 30 separate countries and areas, were given to a total number of

DD/I areas. These figures represent a considerable increase over corresponding 1959 figures. The increase resulted from an expansion of the number of countries covered and from direct efforts on the part of the Staff to increase interest in the courses on the part of branch chiefs and training officers. As part of this approach, courses are given upon request on even very short notice and even to a single traveller, in order to insure that every traveller may have an opportunity to benefit. This practice of ready

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availability has resulted in considerable duplication of courses within short intervals, but, on the other hand, has begun to make the branch chiefs and training officers realize the value of these courses, which may lead to more regular scheduling in the future. Recording of the lectures of visiting speakers enables the Staff to present the same lecture subsequently to single trainees or to groups too small to justify the presence of the speaker himself.

c. It is our impression, gained from comments heard in the course of this survey and through attendance by a member of this staff at part of the course on Latin America, that such orientation courses afford the prospective traveller a valuable insight into his new area, which in turn should enable him to accelerate his adaptation to his new surroundings.

d. In former years the Area Staff also offered more extensive area courses, lasting ten weeks or longer, in which instruction in some depth was offered to employees who required more comprehensive knowledge. Among the areas covered were Africa, the Far East and the Soviet Union. These long courses suffered, however, from lack of students and the decision was taken to offer them in the future only upon specific request. None has been given thus far in 1960, except the course on the Soviet Union, which is now given by the School of International Communism, rather than by Language and Area School.

7. The "Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness" Course

a. Early in 1959 Language and Area School developed and presented a significant new high-level course called "Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness", which is designed to increase the sensitivity to other cultures on the part of the junior officer who is facing his first overseas assignment and

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thereby to make him more effective in his official contacts. (The Americans Abroad Orientation courses are on a lower level and are designed to explain the peculiarities of the specific culture of a foreign country or area and thereby to facilitate the individual's personal adjustment.) This new course offers, first, a study of the methods used in the behavioral sciences for studying and understanding the actions and reactions of individuals, both as individuals and as individuals grouped into societies, and, second, the application of those methods to the practical problems of work and life in other countries. The course is described as "an introduction to the art of assessing and influencing other-culture people through an understanding of their values and behavioral patterns." The course includes also "concern for the human factor in supervision, particularly as influenced by special forces playing on the individual in a foreign environment." The major objective of the course is the more efficient and more effective discharge of Agency responsibilities abroad. The problems of personal adjustment abroad are touched upon incidentally, because of the importance of successful personal adjustment to the effectiveness of an individual's work. This experimental course lasts two weeks and the guest speakers include scientists, anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists of high rank.

b. This course was developed and introduced by the School at the emphatic request of COPS/DDP following a trip to the Far East in the course of which he had observed the inability of high-level Agency personnel to establish communication with the people of that country, quite apart from language difficulties. The course is considered to be directly in line with the recommendations for training U.S. personnel

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that are stated in the 1958 OCB Report entitled "United States Employees Overseas." It has been given three times thus far and is to be given in September to the current JOT class, with the prospect of perhaps being permanently incorporated into the JOTP curriculum. The course received strong endorsement from the group of senior DD/P officers who were selected to attend the second presentation of it in order to evaluate it. We accordingly feel that it is a valuable, high quality contribution to the Agency's training program. It is regrettable that DTR, faced with the general difficulty of obtaining adequate enrollment to OTR's training courses, has tentatively decided not to schedule this course regularly (except to the JOT's, as stated above). We think it quite likely that division chiefs and other senior supervisors would, if made aware of the potential value of such a course, be inclined to grant a higher priority to this course.

It is therefore recommended that:

The DD/P, as well as the DD/I and DD/S, strongly recommend to their division chiefs, assistant directors and other senior officers that they familiarize themselves, through attendance thereat, with the contents of the Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness course.

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F. Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP)

1. Establishment of the Program

a. A recruitment and training program for junior officers was inaugurated in CIA in 1951 immediately following the establishment of the Office of Training. The first class of JOT's was assembled in July of that year. Recruitment of JOT's was assigned to the Office of Personnel, selection and placement were reserved to the JOTP administration, and assessment and training were delegated to the appropriate staffs and schools of OTR. The concept of selection in depth was implemented during the first two years by means of a policy of assigning the trainee, after formal instruction, to on-the-job training with a line unit while continuing his slotting on the OTR rolls. This now well established policy was also based on recognition that the first experiences of the JOT with supervision and work assignments are vital to his long-range motivation and that a monitoring and recovery mechanism is essential both for the man and the program against the hazards of the operational scene. 25X1

b. Also in 1953, a separate campus was acquired by OTR for JOT and other operational training [REDACTED]. This promoted integration of faculty and of curriculum, afforded vastly improved training facilities, and placed the students in surroundings conducive to full concentration on training.

c. Between July of 1951 and December of 1959 the Junior Officer Training Program enrolled a total of 517 men and 59 women, 576 in all, at a rate of about 45 per year during the first five years and

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80 per year from 1956 to the present. In 1960 the JOTP is expanding once again to a new level of 142 students per year. As of the end of 1959 there were a total of 238 JOT graduates on duty in the component offices of the Agency as follows: 187 or 79 per cent with the DD/P, 42 or 18 per cent with the DD/I and nine or three per cent with the DD/S. A loss of 170 JOT students or graduates was incurred over the nine years, and the balance of 168 consisted of students still under JOTP control and assigned either to the first phase formal training or to the second-phase on-the-job training in operating offices.

2. Activities

a. Recruitment of JOT's is performed by the Office of Personnel by means of a staff of seven field recruiters who canvass the U.S. academic world, and, in particular, work through some ☐ consultants spotted in leading colleges and universities. Selection is accomplished by an elaborate filter process which includes for each candidate a field interview and field administered intelligence test, screening and tentative selection by the JOTP, initiation of security clearance, headquarters visits by the candidate for medical examination, assessment testing and extensive interviewing, a pre-employment polygraph test and a final decision based on all of the evidence assembled.

b. Junior officer training commences with a block of ten weeks of instruction at headquarters on international communism and on the structure and functions of the Agency. A prime objective in this period is evaluation of the candidate's suitability for case officer as against intelligence research or support training. This determination

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is made at the end of the first ten weeks of training. The JOT class is then broken into three sections and each henceforth pursues a separate pattern of training. 25X1

c. The 1960 expansion of the JOTP includes increased quotas for the DD/I and DD/S and is requiring OTR to devote increased effort to the design of courses that will be effective for these latter Directorates. The plan for 1960 is to send students earmarked for DD/P case officer training [redacted] 25X1

Students going to the DD/S will be given ten weeks [redacted] Operations Familiarization and Operations Planning and Management. DD/I nominees will take the six-weeks Operations Familiarization Course at [redacted] then return to headquarters for a 12-week course in Intel- 25X1
ligence Production.

d. At the end of approximately six months of formal training, the JOT, while remaining on OTR rolls, is assigned to 12 to 18 months of on-the-job training in an operating office. The sponsoring office must prepare and submit a training plan for each apprentice for JOTP approval. Both the JOT and his supervisor report in writing every four months on the progress of the training. The JOTP has authority to reassign a student when the initial assignment fails to work out satisfactorily.

e. Determination of the initial training assignment and of the permanent assignment at termination of JOTP control are obviously of vital importance to the success of the system. The initiative on these actions has rested largely with the JOTP in the past and has involved

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extensive negotiation principally at the branch level of operating command. In the DD/P the growth of the program is now forcing the evolution of a more formal placement system.

f. In the case of the JOT class completing formal training in June 1960, the DD/P has directed for the first time that Panel C of its Career Service coordinate the assignment process. Panel C has canvassed the operating divisions to obtain JOT requirements including firm commitments to provide suitable on-the-job training and to make slots available for permanent assignment at the end of the training period. The JOTP then nominates students against the Division quotas on a two-category basis. There will be some JOT's who by virtue of language, special talent and preference are peculiarly suited to a particular area. There will be others not thus qualified who may be nominated to several areas. Following nomination there will be interviewing of candidates with the operating office exercising essentially complete freedom to accept or reject each individual on his or her merits. Final transfer of the JOT from JOTP to DD/P control is subject to ratification by Panel C.

g. The pattern of JOT characteristics and backgrounds as developed over the first nine years is of interest. About 40 per cent have fallen within the age bracket 20-24, 50 per cent in the range 25-29, and under 10 per cent 30 years of age and over. The average age at EOD has been 26. Approximately one-third of the trainees possess one or more graduate degrees. About one-fifth have had significant formal training in language and area. Four-fifths have lived or travelled

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overseas for extended periods of time. Half of the male JOT's are married. Five Ivy League schools supplied 106 of the 508 JOT's recruited over the period 1951-1958. Eleven schools out of 148 producing JOT appointments accounted for 40 per cent of the enrollment over the first eight years. During 1958-1959 22 per cent of the recruits came from the Far West and South, 15 per cent from New England and 65 per cent from the Midwest and Middle Atlantic States.

h. As noted earlier, CIA has recently moved to recruit and train a substantially increased portion of its professional officer types through the JOT system. The revised JOT training quotas as approved by the DCI on 27 February 1960 compare with previous rates as follows:

	<u>Annual current number JOTP graduates (Average for FY 58/59)</u>	<u>Graduates authorized 1960 forward</u>
DD/P	55	90
DD/S	3	8
DD/I	<u>6</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	64	123

The JOTP is authorized henceforth to recruit 142 JOT candidates annually, the excess over 123 representing allowance for attrition during training.

i. The new rate of 90 JOT graduates for the DD/P is expected to be reached in 1963. This number will suffice to cover projected annual DD/P losses that must be made good by outside recruitment. In addition to this source, however, there will be staff additions at the GS-9 level and above by promotion, transfers into the DD/P from other parts of the Agency, and separate recruitment for TSD, amounting in all to 60 per year. The projected comprehensive DD/P requirement thus amounts to 150 professional officers GS-9 and above per year. The JOT rate of eight for the

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DD/S is expected to cover from 15 - 25 per cent of the annual requirement for professionals in that Directorate. The DD/I rate of [] will provide from 25 - 40 per cent of its professional needs. 25X9

j. The expanded program spells a substantial increase in workload for the JOT system. Some [] candidates have been interviewed annually in recent years to produce [] referrals to headquarters. About half of these have led to initiation of clearance, further assessment and the end result of [] EOD's for junior officer training. It is estimated that the new quotas will require in chain sequence [] field interviews, [] field referrals, and [] clearance actions to net [] trainees. The number of professional recruiters has already been increased to nine to meet the added burden of requirements. A plan also is under consideration to expand the consultant program to cover more universities and to stimulate a greater response to recruitment needs. 25X9

k. The outlook in JOT recruiting for 1960 is thought to be generally satisfactory, particularly so in the case of candidates offering graduate degrees. This attests to the apparent competitiveness of the Agency position in the market. The GS-7 is now the standard entrance grade and the GS-9 is generally granted at graduation from the JOTP two years later. There is considerable concern, however, over the fact that 48 accepted candidates rejected the Agency's offer in 1959 due to better opportunities elsewhere, doubts about the program or change in personal circumstances. While this loss may simply indicate the price of doing business in a quality market, it obviously bears watching to ensure that the Agency makes a strong appeal to talented individuals and that it remains competitive salary-wise in the market. 25X9

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1. The JOTP has achieved solid acceptance in the Agency by locating students of high character and demonstrated academic performance, then instructing and motivating them in the objectives and methods of intelligence to the point where they readily adapt to and become productive in operating assignments. Once separated from the JOTP, the stiffest test of all is the willingness and ability of the JOT to fend for himself.

3. Future of the JOT Program

a. Recruitment

(1) Numerous policy questions arise in this area of administration of the JOT system. Many of these stand out in a comparison of the JOTP with the Foreign Service Officer recruitment program in the Department of State. By contrast, the JOTP administration has enjoyed singular freedom of action while the Department has been subject to constant public and congressional examination particularly as an outgrowth of the work of the Wriston Committee. New rules and structure may be imposed on the JOTP to achieve specific benefits but at considerable risk of hampering the positive leadership the program has enjoyed thus far. The Department's policies and experience should, however, be followed closely with the intention of adopting and profiting from measures of proven benefit.

(2) JOT recruitment does not assuredly reach all American citizens who may possess suitable qualifications for careers in CIA. The absence of a publicly advertised, competitive entrance test, and the use of professional officers on recruitment tours (as now

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practiced in the case of ORR) would remove any doubt that the Agency does not adequately protect the inherent privilege of citizens to learn of and to apply for employment with it.

(3) There is no requirement that the JOTP balance its appointments by State or region of origin and schooling. While the present patterns of recruitment do not appear to be seriously out of balance in this respect there are aspects of the Agency's policy here which will bear observation. The first is the possible political implication at some time in the future of disproportionately low representation of officers from the South and to a lesser extent from the Far West. The second concerns heavy recruitment of students from Ivy League schools and the possible influences on loyalty to associates and judgment of individual performance which this circumstance may be alleged to generate.

(4) The JOTP administration may be assuming excessive responsibility in the screening and selection of junior officer candidates. This same issue is noted below in connection with the final assessment and assignment of JOT's to active duty. As the JOTP assumes increasing responsibility for determining the types of individuals who are to man the Agency it seems obvious that the current operating experience of senior professional officers should be brought to bear in making the decision. There are today fairly numerous consumer comments that present JOTP selections tend to overemphasize intellectual qualities and to underemphasize rugged and adventurous traits. A policy of panel examination of top candidates with professional line officers included on the panels would insure JOTP sensitivity to Agency needs at this point.

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(5) There is a second possible source of independent judgment of applicant qualifications in the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process. These individuals may have the handicap of limited acquaintance with intelligence but they may also contribute useful insight based on long experience in government, corporation or university administration.

b. Agency Sponsorship of JOT Military Duty

From its inception, the JOTP has sponsored military duty for candidates who have not fulfilled this requirement and whose services would probably be lost to the Agency unless employment were arranged prior to military service. A noteworthy feature of the program has been the arrangement with the Services to detail the JOT officer back to the Agency for the last 12 - 24 months of his active duty status. During the first eight years there were 141 cases of military sponsorship of which 83 or 59 per cent remained on duty at the end of the period. The program has been expensive to the Agency in loss of time from intelligence training and in the high attrition suffered. The JOTP has been able to recruit the majority of its students with military training already accomplished. A recently introduced factor in the situation is the decision to give selected JOT's additional formal training in paramilitary subjects. A correlation of the two blocks of training may prove possible and of benefit to the Agency.

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c. Intelligence Training for Specialists

The JOTP has been oriented from its beginning toward the development of generalists. It has sought to recruit and train junior officers of fairly diverse background to perform basic intelligence assignments anywhere in the world. The JOT generalist has proved himself well suited to the professional work of the DD/P and to many of the basic duties of the Offices of Current Intelligence and Operations in the DD/I. With limited exceptions, the Program has not undertaken systematic recruitment and training in intelligence for specialists -- lawyers, accountants, economists and scientists -- required by the DD/S, the research offices of the DD/I and the Technical Services Division of the DD/P. This situation poses two questions which the Agency has yet to answer: Will the specialist profit from formal training in intelligence? Should the Agency pursue a policy of developing all of its professional officers and in particular its future leadership according to a common basic training and development pattern? The arguments on both sides of these questions are diverse. There is reluctance in the support and research areas to afford the training time involved in the case of specialists. There is a widespread opinion that the principal career opportunities lie with the DD/P and that JOT's will not voluntarily elect service with the DD/S or DD/I. On the other hand, the small number of JOT's who have been assigned to specialist duties in the Agency have served with distinction and, finally, the current plan to introduce more JOT's into the DD/I and DD/S seems certain to bring these questions into sharper focus in the near future. It seems safe to say that the possibilities of a single, integrated plan for recruitment and development of all professional officers is the course

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for the future. (The problem of training specialists for the intelligence profession is appraised more fully in the following section of this report entitled "Training the Specialist Professional Officer".)

d. Placement of JOT's

(1) The JOTP exercises substantial freedom in the assessment and allocation of JOT's to specialized training and in their placement in operating offices for on-the-job training. Part of the explanation lies with the Agency, part with the JOT's themselves.

(2) Few if any Agency components have successfully projected manpower requirements several years into the future, either in terms of numbers or special qualifications. Any projected division requirement for a given number of officers with specific language, area, or other competence may have doubled or evaporated three years hence depending on a host of possible developments. In consequence, operating offices have been forced to limit their specifications to the general qualifications of character, educational performance, linguistic aptitude and personality. The JOTP has employed educational and psychological screening as aids to JOT selection but in the last analysis has relied on its collective judgment based on long experience.

(3) The Program has also shown considerable tolerance toward the preferences of the individual JOT, both at time of selection for specialized, e.g., case officer, training and later in the selection of a job assignment. Some men with excellent qualifications for the DD/I and DD/S can regularly be expected to find the DD/P more attractive. Thus it is not certain at this stage that the new DD/I and DD/S quotas can be

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filled. There is an understandable gravitational pull to the DD/P career but in addition there is a subtle instructor and student climate that rates selection to the DD/P as success and allocation to the other Directorates as "second rank" performance. In some instances this climate is generated even in the recruitment stage. The JOTP, OTR and the Office of Personnel must combat these prejudices with vigor if they are to cater successfully to the basic needs of the DD/I and DD/S.

(4) The JOTP and the Directorates are overly isolated from each other and communication on junior officer training policies at the intermediate command levels is clearly deficient. One answer, as with recruitment, is to rotate line officers to serve on JOTP panels that make basic decisions so that their advice on placement policy will be assured. The JOTP will acquire a convincing base for its judgments and the line officials will return to their regular duties with increased awareness of training and personnel development policies.

e. Attrition among JOT's

(1) It was noted earlier that the JOT is expected to stand on his own two feet following graduation from JOTP sponsorship. How well he is succeeding in doing so is a matter of obvious concern to trainers for the light it may shed on the effectiveness of selection, instruction and motivation. The subject is of increasing interest in the Agency; however, there is as yet no systematic program for review of JOT careers and identification of adjustment problems before they mature to the point of resignation. Both the Office of Personnel and the Inspector General Staff conduct resignation interviews, and the Directors

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of Personnel and OTR and the JOTP see many JOT's and ex-JOT's informally on career matters.

(2) There has been severe attrition amounting to a total of some 20 per cent per year among JOT's in training. Of these, the JOT's under military sponsorship have contributed a loss rate of 40 per cent, women 17 per cent and civilian men 14 per cent. Approximately one-half have departed to pursue other careers of greater interest to them while the remainder have left for reasons associated with CIA employment. There is no evidence at hand that would indicate that the Agency's experience is unfavorable when compared to that of other large organizations. In view, however, of basic handicaps facing careers in intelligence including security restrictions, ethical issues and the relatively low ceiling on earning power, it is essential that the Agency regularly measure its officer development experience against that of comparable organizations.

(3) The attrition record for JOT graduates is even more difficult to evaluate. The evidence for the classes of 1951 through 1955 should be of interest since these individuals are by now well advanced in status as case officers with five to seven years of experience on-the-job. The significance of the record is qualified, however, by the rapid evolution of recruitment and instruction policy during this initial phase of the program and by the fact that these classes were launched in the setting of the Korean War, the rapid early expansion of the Agency's manpower, and in an era of business prosperity with varied employment opportunity. Of the 243 individuals enrolled over the five years,

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1951-1955, there were 118 remaining on duty at the start of 1960. Of the 125 losses, approximately half occurred from duty stations following graduation from the JOTP. Thirty-five of the student losses were cases of failure to return from military duty.

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(4) At the present time JOT graduates account for approximately six per cent of the [] professionals, GS-9 and above, in the DD/P. The patterns of JOT career adjustment may be expected to change considerably as this proportion increases and as JOT careerists begin to compete for senior grade jobs. In the DD/P there are a number of questions here which will require forthright, coordinated answers if JOT graduates are not to walk the halls trying haphazardly to achieve personal solutions.

(5) There is no consensus thus far on what training and experience should constitute the case officer apprenticeship. In the absence of a pattern, the individual faces many difficulties in planning his future and gauging his progress, while his supervisor in the absence of a doctrine tends to let immediate operational priorities override the longer range career considerations involved.

(6) There are no standards setting forth minimum training and language competence which the apprentice must possess as prerequisites to the given overseas assignment. There is a proliferation of advanced operations courses but no policy as to which are essential to initial overseas assignment and which may wait for a subsequent tour of duty at headquarters.

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(7) There is no pattern in the scheduling of overseas duty. The prospect of overseas assignment is a significant factor in JOT recruitment and therefore a possible source of frustration when the junior officer finds his initial headquarters tour stretching into the third and occasionally the fourth year. The present prospect is that this issue will grow in importance as the four-year or longer tour of duty becomes standard Agency practice. It is conceivable that the DD/P will have to establish a ceiling on the number of months of headquarters duty the Junior Officer shall serve prior to assignment overseas.

(8) Another approach to the concept of apprenticeship is to schedule some of it overseas including formal training in language and area. This has the appeal of realism and the drawbacks of greater expense and difficulty in finding supervisors who are qualified and motivated to work with junior officers and who can find the time under operating pressures to provide effective guidance. The prospect of a large influx of JOT's into the DD/P annually only two years hence makes it appear desirable to experiment now with this approach.

(9) Problems in the management of JOT's with 10 or 15 years of experience as case officers lie some distance in the future. With respect to the question of formal or refresher training for such officers, the present experimentation of the Department of State with mid-career and senior officer training is of interest. Many officers at this stage will be moving into chief of base and deputy chief of station assignments for which as yet there is no formal preparation. The question of diversification of experience through rotation is one

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which faces the senior JOT graduates, and non-JOT's, at the present time. There is insufficient evidence for generalization but in some cases the experience here has been discouraging. Some former JOT's now operate on the conviction that diversification is a matter of personal initiative, and accomplished by knowing the right person and being in the right place at the right time. Well qualified officers have located suitable vacancies only to find that the concern of the employing Branch for its own, perhaps less well qualified individuals, has precluded appointment. The net result then is frustration and possible resignation for the individual and haphazard administration of the broad personnel objectives of the Directorate. The power of decision here lies with the Branch Chief. The Panel system of Career management as now constituted doesn't really get at the problems involved. In some manner, particularly in the case of highly qualified and expensively trained JOT's, it will be essential that the DD/P, and in time the DD/I and DD/S, provide for a more orderly personnel administration. The career officer must know what to expect and how to plan the broad outlines of his career. The Department of State is also experimenting with this problem as a result of severe criticism by the Wriston Committee of its previous informal practices. Recent State innovations include the development of training and experience standards for all Foreign Service positions, the establishment of an inventory system on punched cards to record individual training status and to derive annual training requirements, the imposition of sanctions to enforce training policy including a requirement that language competence be a prerequisite to advancement, and, finally, the creation

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of a Career Development and Counselling Staff of experienced Foreign Service Officers to advise on personnel policy and monitor the career planning of individual officers. These measures are not yet proved instruments of a forward looking personnel management policy, nor are they necessarily suited to the needs of CIA. They do merit close observation and they are suggestive of the directions in which the Agency may need to move if it experiences severe attrition among its most highly qualified and carefully trained personnel.

It is recommended that:

- (a) The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOTP
- (b) The DTR establish a JOT Selection Panel composed of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates together with appropriate representation from the Office of Personnel and Training. The Chief, JOTP, should chair the panel.
- (c) The DTR should give consideration to the feasibility of the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process recommended above.
- (d) The DTR arrange for the participation on a rotational basis of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates in JOTP placement panels.
- (e) The DTR together with the Director of Personnel take steps to eliminate prejudices that have arisen which tend to assign second class status to DD/S and DD/I careers.
- (f) The DD/P establish minimum standards of training and experience for case officer apprenticeship including general preparatory, basic skills, language and advanced operational training, and that he determine the feasibility by experiment of some form of overseas familiarization as a part of the apprentice period.
- (g) The DTR together with the Director of Personnel undertake to monitor the present efforts of the Department of State to improve personnel management and training in the Foreign Service for measures that may be adopted for the Agency's benefit.

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4. Training the Specialist Professional Officer

a. The following discussion of training policy and programs in ORR is intended to highlight the problems of the specialist professional officer in CIA. Although not necessarily typical of all specialists, it contains the basic elements applicable to those who prepare for a chosen vocation prior to embarking on an intelligence career. ORR was selected because it has devoted much time and careful consideration to the possible roles of training in the development of economists for intelligence. The conclusions that have evolved out of its experience to date are so basic and so clear that they merit citing in detail. They are contained in a paper prepared in 1958 on the subject of "Training for Economic Intelligence Production" and may be summarized as follows:

- (1) A foundation in the conceptual framework of economics;
- (2) Ability to work in primary sources through command of the necessary languages;
- (3) Study of the geography, economies, histories and cultures, as well as the government and politics of target countries;
- (4) Appreciation of the impact of new weapon systems on military strategy, national security and the industrial economies of countries concerned;
- (5) Familiarity with industrial and technical problems and developments;
- (6) Indoctrination in the machinery and procedures of intelligence.

b. The fourth and sixth areas clearly fall within the responsibility of the intelligence community to provide although it should be noted that the requirement is for orientation, not professional competence, in the fields of technology or strategy concerned. The balance of the specifications relate to the normal present-day academic preparation of economists. Their underlying purpose is indoctrination in research methodology. All of which makes

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it clear that ORR will normally expect to recruit its professionals ready trained from the open market. In fact, it is doubtful that an intelligence organization could justify or succeed if it undertook to provide such professional preparation internally in competition with academic institutions.

c. The normal career considerations of professional economists continue to exert a major influence on ORR training policy once an economist is recruited and entered on duty in the office. The sabbatical at the end of ten or more years of professional service is mentioned with increasing frequency as the most natural and desirable block of training at mid-career. It is a consideration for the future in ORR only because of the youth of the Office and of its professional personnel.

d. Professional stature through full-fledged participation in professional associations is another element of almost equal importance. ORR was required on security grounds to bar its professionals from such participation during the first years of its existence. Beginning in 1959, however, the Office turned to outside economist consultants to evaluate periodically the quality of its performance. Two of their recommendations since adopted have called for responsible participation by ORR economists in their professional associations, and for distribution of selected sanitized ORR studies to a roster of some 150 economists and businessmen throughout the country. The implication is that ORR economists have been in danger of becoming inbred as intelligence researchers. A further motivation for the change is the hope that overt demonstration of quality will ease the ORR recruitment problem which is discussed below in another context.

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e. Thus the profile of the present-day professional economist in intelligence reflects the strong gravitational pull of the academic world. Training requirements that would mean substantial and continuing instructional load for OTR have been at a minimum. Internal training for the economist in intelligence has tended to be peripheral to his specialty or focussed on deficiencies in performance. The freer contacts now in prospect between ORR and the outside world indeed are likely to reinforce present patterns and to accelerate the adaptation of academic career patterns to ORR needs.

f. This ORR pattern which appears eminently sensible from the perspective of the economist must also, however, be examined from the point of view of the intelligence administrator. The painful fact in the present period is that economists are in exceeding short supply in the market. Therefore the natural policy of recruitment of prepared professionals does not work. ORR is forced to resort to emergency recruitment measures including employment of partially trained economists. A number of conflicts then arise over the manner in which such individuals may best be prepared for and integrated into the profession of economist in intelligence. 0

g. Some five years ago ORR began experiencing personnel shortages which it then undertook to make good by regularly sending professional economists to canvass the universities jointly with the Agency's recruiters. The results to date have been generally disappointing with an average of three to five recruitments for every 100 interviews of selected potential candidates. These recruitment teams have been at a disadvantage in the salary competition among other things and through time have sought and secured certain compensations such as authority to reimburse for EOD travel expenses when the candidate

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possesses an M. A. degree. This authority has not thus far been extended to the other recruitment programs of the Agency including, in particular, the JOTP, which suggests a need for greater uniformity of practice as noted in the discussion of that program.

h. In light of these disappointing results ORR late in 1959 developed a junior economist training program which as now contemplated proposes to recruit students in their senior year of college, bring them into the Agency upon graduation for a year of orientation and assessment, then send the most promising to graduate schools for advanced training (the Masters Degree) at Agency expense. This approach has now been authorized but is not yet underway.

i. The relationship between this program and the Agency's JOT program at the present time is ambiguous to say the least. The recently approved plans for expansion of the JOT program call for the delivery of 25 graduates per year to the DD/I. Obviously some will go to ORR. Many of these men and women will have had graduate training, some of it in the social sciences. The training of the DD/I JOT's will be characterized by increased emphasis on intelligence research methodology and reduced emphasis on clandestine operations.

j. The prospect of all of this, however, is that ORR will now be recruiting three different patterns of professionals no two of which will have a common preparation in intelligence. The JOT will be exceptionally well grounded in intelligence and perhaps, though not necessarily, less well prepared in economics and research methodology. The ORR junior economist will apparently have no grounding other than apprenticeship experience in

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intelligence research and will not even achieve productive professional status as an economist until some time in the third year or later. Finally, it is to be expected that ORR will succeed in recruiting some professionally trained economists but these will receive little beyond orientation to compare with the JOT's advanced preparation in intelligence.

k. For further evidence of the desirability of exposing economists to JOT training, the records of JOT trained personnel now on duty in ORR were examined. The evidence supplied for all eleven individuals involved showed impressively favorable results. A number of these JOT's had had full operations training and even some experience in DD/P assignments. It is conceivable that some of their effectiveness in their ORR roles resulted from their fuller appreciation of collection methodology and programs.

l. Also to be noted in passing is the conflict between JOT and ORR demands on the recruitment system. ORR makes heavy use of the Agency's professional recruiters each fall at the time they are needed and will be needed increasingly to support the expanded JOT requirement. There is even some indication of competition between the two requirements for the same individual.

m. The recent Inspector General's Survey of the CIA Career Service proposed for career management purposes to classify the economist as a specialist outside the profession of intelligence. His calling is not peculiar to the Agency and he has the option of pursuing it elsewhere in the government or in private life whenever he chooses to do so. The reaction of ORR economists and other DD/I specialists to this proposition was emphatic disagreement and the counterclaim that they be classified in the first place as professional intelligence officers, secondly as economists.

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n. Thus the issue for the DD/I is whether to develop the specialist intelligence officer with or without training in intelligence? The paper on "Training for Economic Intelligence Production" referred to earlier prescribed only the basic orientation course (now three weeks in length) as formal introduction to intelligence. Nothing more. Apparently ORR expects to rely almost exclusively on experience without the benefit of training to broaden the outlook and acquaint the ORR career economist with the many aspects of the total intelligence business that add up to the profession of intelligence.

o. There is an alternative to this approach and it lies in providing some training in common for all intelligence officers regardless of their specializations. This objective underlies the JOT program and has done so from its start although here again separatist tendencies in the component offices of the Agency have led to excessive JOTP concentration on DD/P officer requirements.

p. An obvious additional means to the present end is a policy of rotation of officers between compatible assignments in the research and collection arms of the Agency. The DD/I offices have always been receptive to such action, the DD/P generally opposed on grounds of security, staffing difficulties and the lack of inducements that would bring DD/P careerists for tours of duty in the DD/I. No one has argued that the DD/I officer must rotate to the role of case officer and manage agents. On the other hand, the preparation of many DD/I professionals for tours of duty as reports officers in the DD/P is obviously excellent and well above the level of preparation of many present-day reports officers. There is little question but that the

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area competence of the DD/I professional would profit enormously from this intensely practical intelligence experience. Out of the arrangement would also come opportunity for on-the-spot interpretation of DD/I requirements in the field. The DD/P reports officer serving in the DD/I could be expected to benefit in turn from increased awareness of the uses to which his reports are put and of their present-day limitations in the eyes of consumers.

q. There is no intent here to advise reduction in the amount of kinds of present-day ORR training for economists. Nor at this stage will agreement come easily on the content of training in intelligence for ORR and other DD/I specialists. The DD/I must work very closely with the Office of Training in the future to insure that such training, particularly that provided DD/I JOT's, is of professional quality, realistic, and accomplishing results equivalent to the successes achieved by the JOT program in the DD/P to date.

r. The role of the economist in intelligence is likely to change with any increase in emphasis on his training in intelligence. It may be preferable over time to staff ORR with a small corps of professional economists at the Ph. D. level by lateral recruitment or contract and to support this group with a much larger staff of professional officers well trained in economics and in the doctrine and methodology of intelligence. The latter would constitute a professional economist-intelligence officer corps with preparation and versatility that would enable them to serve effectively both in collection and analytical roles. If the economist is not to have professional training in intelligence, and if the Agency cannot find a way to recruit and hold him for career purposes, then the DD/I may be well advised

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to contract for his economic analysis with an outside organization in the sense of the

s. Due to the youth of the organization perhaps more than for any other reason there is yet to evolve a consensus on what constitutes the professional intelligence officer both generalist and specialist. In its absence agreement is difficult to reach on how he is to be recruited and trained. Lack of agreement produces the paradoxes that are now apparent in the recruitment and training programs discussed above.

It is recommended that:

(1) The DD/I direct that the recruitment and initial training of junior analysts be accomplished through the JOTP; that increased emphasis be placed by the Agency's recruitment facility on the recruitment of JOT's with academic backgrounds suited to DD/I needs; that ORR and other specialists recruitment be phased down as production of JOT's increases and generally limited to senior analysts at the Ph. D. level.

(2) The DD/I and the DD/P initiate a test program for the rotation of qualified DD/I professionals to the DD/P to serve as reports officers with part of the tour to be spent overseas, DD/P reports officers in turn to rotate to the DD/I for training and experience in the evaluation and use of intelligence reporting.*

(3) Advanced external training for analysts be phased somewhat later in the career pattern, perhaps after the fifth year of duty, to permit maximum play of JOTP and other intelligence preparation during the apprenticeship period.

*Note: A similar recommendation was made in the Inspector General's survey of the Far East Division, DD/P, dated June 1958. The lack of recognizable progress in this important effort impels us to repeat the recommendation here.

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IV. OTHER AGENCY TRAINING

A. Non-OTR Training

1. Formal courses of instruction are conducted within several of the Agency's major components to train employees in their own special fields. The OTR provides technical guidance and assistance in setting up the courses, furnishes training materials, testing and other services, monitors the instruction and maintains Training records.

2. Such training is conducted in each of the major components of the DD/S area. The extensive facilities of the Office of Communications are discussed in a later section of this Survey. The Office of Personnel runs a two-week Personnel Officers course primarily intended for those officers serving in other components of the Agency both in headquarters and overseas. There also has been established a program of semiannual conferences for senior Personnel officers.

3. Internal training in the Office of Logistics assumes greater proportions. Many officers in the professional categories, such as engineers, lawyers and specialists, bring their qualifications with them when they enter Agency employment and generally must go outside the Agency when additional training is required. The internal program has been designed for the majority of rank and file logistics careerists who must learn how to handle the Agency's complex logistics requirements. The principal training effort is the Logistics Support Course which runs for six weeks and is given at least twice annually. In this course the trainee who is preparing for field assignment receives instruction in procurement, supply, warehousing, real estate, transportation and other

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specialties. Other formal courses of lesser duration include a general logistics orientation, a procurement seminar for higher level officers and other subjects of concern to logistics officers.

4. Training in logistical support for non-Logistics careerists has been primarily tutorial in nature up to the present time but more formal arrangements are evolving. The development of an indoctrination course on Logistics procedures for DD/P field personnel is being encouraged by increasing requirements for such instruction. Efforts are being made to introduce a suitable course in 1961.

5. The Comptroller's Office conducts formal courses in Principles of Budget, Cost Principles, Budget Formulation and the specialized techniques of internal budgetary systems. Although primarily designed for budget and finance careerists these courses are open to administrative and operations officers as well and such attendance is encouraged.

6. The Office of Security also has a rather extensive formal training program which includes basic instruction for special agents, training security officers to support clandestine operations, indoctrination in audio countermeasures techniques and 25X1

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7. Within the DD/I area the Office of Operations with its diversified activities accounts for the major part of internal training. Contact Division conducts a combination of basic and refresher training covering information gathering techniques both in general and in specific

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substantive fields. Headquarters and regional conferences are held at regular intervals to keep field representatives in touch with current activities. [] runs formal courses on propaganda analysis and reporting and FDD conducts foreign language reading courses designed for its own careerists but open to others as well.

8. The Office of Central Reference has developed a formal course of instruction in the CIA Library Indexing System for the training of Agency documents analysts and reference librarians and personnel of the military services who are concerned with the Intelligence Subject Code. It also conducts field trips for industrial analysts to familiarize them with equipment, techniques and products of various US industries.

9. The Office of Research and Reports gives instruction in economic statistics and reports writing and is in process of launching a "baccalaureate" program which is discussed in detail in another section of this report. Photo Intelligence Center runs a short course in photo interpretation and is considering an external contract for training in photogrammetry for its staff officers. OSI is in process of evaluating its internal training needs and probably will establish a formal training program soon. 25X1

10. In the Clandestine Service the two major training activities, Technical School and [] have already been described. Other training is now limited to Records Integration Division courses in records keeping and mechanization. 25X1

11. The cost of non-OTR training cannot be determined. Except for Communications, Technical School and [] these training activities

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are not budgeted and costs are not recorded. Instruction is provided by regular staff officers, space is found wherever available, and administrative overhead is absorbed in the regular cost of doing business.

12. The need for this type of specialized training is unchallenged. Objectives are clearly defined and standards are uniformly high. It is directed at the people who need it and since it is under local control it is taken as required. It comes closest to having the chief qualities of the ideal training situation in which needs, requirements, standards, methods of instruction, course content, level and duration, and attendance are all given direction by a single authority.

13. While the evaluation of non-OTR training is generally favorable there is emerging a problem which requires careful attention. It is evident that there is a growing tendency to extend some of these individual courses from the essentially specialized training of a well defined limited group of employees into the larger area of general training by inviting attendance by non-careerists whose assignments are only remotely related to the specific subject being taught. This trend if unchecked will lead to an undesirable dispersion of training responsibility and authority and an uneconomical duplication of training functions. The Inspector General supports the concept of centralization of training wherever the factors of economy, efficiency and effectiveness prevail. When a limited purpose training program is enlarged to serve a general need it should be tested against certain criteria to determine whether the responsibility should remain with the component or be assumed by OTR. Such criteria may be expressed as follows:

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Is there a demonstrated need for training employees other than members of the sponsoring career service?

Are additional training facilities required beyond those possessed by the component conducting the program?

Is the course content or doctrine derived from or substantially augmented by another career service?

Does the program require additional manpower either for instruction or support?

14. Existing regulations are not explicit on this point. The DTR's responsibility to develop and direct training programs within OTR is clear but for non-OTR training it is blurred by references to review, approval and advice to Deputy Directors. In the opinion of the Inspector General it should be the clear responsibility of the DTR to determine under whose auspices such training programs should be conducted.

It is recommended that:

- a. The DTR be specifically charged with the responsibility of determining under whose auspices non-OTR training will be conducted and,
- b. Pertinent Agency regulations be amended accordingly.

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B. External Training

1. Authority for "Training at Non-CIA Facilities under the Government Employees Training Act" is contained in Agency Regulation revised 23 June 1960. The regulation specifies that Operating Officials shall originate requests for external training, that heads of career services shall review and endorse all requests, and that the Office of Training shall designate non-CIA facilities with the concurrence of the Director of Security, approve or disapprove all requests, set administrative requirements for participation in external courses and budget and control funds necessary to meet the cost of such training.

2. Under the above authority, CIA sent 759 of its personnel to courses, conferences or demonstrations provided by 103 outside organizations during 1959. An additional 465 persons were enrolled in correspondence courses or in local classes conducted by International Business Machine and Radio Corporation of America in the field of data processing and communications. The cost of the year's program amounted to approximately \$300,000, including travel and per diem as well as registration fees.

3. Of the 759 persons attending external training programs, 499 participated in full-time courses, 260 in part-time courses. Approximately one-half of the enrollments involved absences of one week or less from regular duties.

4. A breakdown of the non-CIA organizations providing training shows that 34 per cent consisted of American universities, 34 per cent were governmental, of which half were civilian, half military, 24 per cent

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were private commercial or professional organizations, six per cent were tutorial in nature, and the balance, two per cent, were foreign governments and universities.

5. The following is a resume of the principal external training programs. External language training was provided to 96 Agency personnel of whom 39 were enrolled full-time, 57 part-time, in language courses averaging a semester in duration and often representing installments towards long-term language training objectives. The general problem of language training is examined in detail elsewhere in this survey. For the present, it may be noted that the range of languages included here is by no means limited to the so-called exotic varieties. The training in world languages as a rule reflected special operating requirements, or conflicts in scheduling between the OTR language curriculum and the individual's assignment and travel plans.

6. A total of 100 individuals attended various weapons and missile orientation courses sponsored by the Armed Services. This requirement has been noted in the section of this survey which deals with the training of professional officers in the DD/I. Both economists and scientists have a pervasive need to appreciate the implications of the new weaponry, something which cannot be adequately accomplished by reading nor obtained from unclassified sources.

7. A third example of external training sharply focussed on a specific Agency need is correspondence course training in electronics for personnel of the Office of Communications. There were 143 new enrollments in 1959 and an overall total of 570 OC personnel participating in such training at the end of June 1960. The program reflects both the rapidly changing

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character of this complex field and the desire to enlarge the career opportunities of journeymen communicators (GS-7-9) who characteristically bring high school educations and military training to the job.

8. The external training for professional personnel in CIA is extremely diverse in character. In part it reflects refresher needs, in part individual deficiencies, but over-all probably reflects an effort to adapt a basic preparation in a profession to the peculiar interests and emphases of the Agency. As discussed in the section of the survey dealing with DD/I professional careers and training requirements, it seems entirely possible that external training for professionals in the form of sabbaticals will expand considerably as the Agency ages and a substantial portion of its personnel moves to mid-career status with seniorities of ten and twenty years of experience.

9. The Agency's external training in skills is intensely practical. It reflects such situations as the acquisition of complex equipment and the necessity of training personnel to operate and maintain it. The record shows that this training ranged through courses in diesel motors, heliarc welding, photolithography, packaging and carloading, and fire inspection. The second principal cluster of skills courses concerned business subjects such as patents, contracts, accounting, budgeting and fiscal procedure, executive and management training, and cost reduction in office personnel management.

10. Present-day policy on external management training appears to be forward looking in character and to provide for a sampling of the principal external offerings in order to keep Agency personnel abreast of

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this new and rapidly changing subject. Agency participants are required to have completed OTR management training as a qualification for enrollment.

11. Participation in conferences and seminars may be both a reward for and stimulus to improved performance in Agency assignments. The relatively small numbers of individuals attending any given program simultaneously would appear to reflect sober management reservations about junketing and the preferable alternative of seeing that the trainee relays his information to his associates through staff meetings, trip reports and other suitable devices.

12. It is unlikely that there can ever be complete agreement about the line to be drawn between external training clearly addressed to Agency needs and that which enhances the individual's powers in a specialty for which he was hired and in which he has a moral obligation to maintain proficiency on his own initiative. A prime test in justifying both external and internal training policy is the rate of attrition among individuals in whom the Agency has invested expensive training. A substantial resignation rate is noted elsewhere in the discussions of JOT training and the training of economists for ORR. The school of thought that places principal emphasis on on-the-job training is inclined to be extremely sceptical about subsidized training in an employee's chosen professional field. The feeling is that it tends to forgive the individual his personal obligation and yields a low return in terms of job motivation and attrition. This group would place greater emphasis on the individual's motivation and responsibility by delaying such investment

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until there was reasonable demonstration of career intentions and in the area of sabbatical training would ask the individual to bear a substantial portion of the cost himself.

13. Better evidence is required on which to base a judgment of the present balance and effectiveness of the external training program. As one step towards tighter administration of the program it is suggested that the Office of Personnel assemble the training records of resignees for a period of twelve months and that appropriate representatives of OTR examine this evidence to determine whether there is a reasonable rate of return from external training investments and whether modifications are desirable in the guidelines to approving officials concerning minimum length of service in the Agency prior to external training, ceiling on amount and frequency of external training to be invested in the given staff member, and length of service to which the individual should be obligated following such training.

It is recommended that:

DTR review the training records of employees in professional categories who resigned from the Agency during FY 1960, or longer if necessary, to determine if a more definitive policy governing external training is required.

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C. On-The-Job Training

1. In the total process of acquiring knowledge necessary to perform assigned tasks effectively, on-the-job training plays a major role. It goes on constantly in every place and at every level and it takes many forms. Advice, guidance and direction given and received by superior and subordinate alike, experience derived from daily work activity, the interchange of opinion, thoughts, ideas and observations, all contribute to the process of learning while working. In fact it may be said that the formalized training courses such as those conducted by OTR merely supplement on-the-job training. ?

2. In this respect the burden of training falls upon the supervisors in all echelons of the command structure. It is not only the mechanics or the techniques of the job that the employee must master, but his growth and development that also is involved. While this responsibility is generally acknowledged by most supervisors it is not observed uniformly or consistently and presents one of the major management problems of the Agency.

3. One of the benefits derived from the adoption in 1956 of the five per cent training requirement was the stimulus given the on-the-job program. Wherever such training was organized into a recognizable course with proper objectives, specified periods of time and qualified direction, it was accepted as the equivalent of formal OTR courses and credited against the requirement accordingly. As a result more time and attention was given this activity by responsible officers and a general improvement in on-the-job training was achieved. The OTR was able to better perform its assigned functions of review and approval. ?

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4. Although the five per cent requirement has been rescinded all other elements of responsibility for on-the-job training remain. The Deputy Directors and Operating officials are charged by [] with ensuring that their employees are properly trained, including organized on-the-job training. The DTR still is responsible for developing effective programs and the general supervision of the training effort. With respect to on-the-job training the responsibility of the DTR is almost impossible to perform satisfactorily.

5. On-the-job training is not fully organized throughout the Agency and it is impractical to attempt to impose a formalized program much beyond what has already been done. A number of components have well designed courses of instruction but these are generally limited to orientation or simple skills related to internal procedures. Here the DTR can provide the usual support and is able to evaluate the results. The bulk of on-the-job training does not lend itself to organization and it would be patently unfair to hold DTR responsible for any measure of supervision. Furthermore, it is, in our view, improper to divide the responsibility between the appropriate commanders and the head of a supporting service.

6. Deputy Directors are quite properly charged with ensuring that employees are adequately trained and it is equally proper for them to look to their senior subordinates to perform this task. For effective performance, however, the responsibility must not be reassigned below this level. All Agency components, including the area divisions of the Clandestine Service, have designated someone as a training officer. In smaller components he may have other duties to perform; in others he may have assistance. His functions vary from place to place but in the majority he performs duties of a routine nature.

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His stature also varies but in general it is far too low to enable him to effectively handle the training responsibilities of the component head.

7. The solution to this problem lies first in the acceptance of training as a function of command; second, the establishment of the training responsibility at the highest level of component command at a minimum; third, the elimination of the split responsibility that now rests obscurely on the DTR. This can be accomplished within present Agency personnel ceilings although some increase in grade level may be required.

It is recommended that:

a. The DCI authorize the establishment of senior grade positions for selected Training Officers at the Assistant Director or DD/P Division Chief level with job qualifications designed to ensure the effective performance of proper training functions.

b. The DTR initiate an amendment to [] which more clearly describes his responsibility to render only advice, guidance and support to the on-the-job training effort.

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D. Communications Training

1. Introduction

a. The Office of Communications (OC) is responsible for the development of staff competence in the fields of radio operation, cryptography, and maintenance of communications equipment. To meet these responsibilities it must train a replacement flow of communicators, retrain and refresh its entire corps periodically in changing techniques and equipment, and ensure that its engineers and senior managers achieve a level of competence that fully supports the communications requirements of the Agency.

b. Research and development throughout the field of communications is in an extremely dynamic state in the present period, accordingly there is a continuing cycle of improvement in equipment, training of personnel in its operation and maintenance, followed by its phasing into operations. Obsolescence status does not necessarily follow for older equipment, however, since the range of CIA requirements runs the spectrum from nearly automatic, high volume central message systems to a one-man manual operations. The ultimate imperative of the system is to have an individual ready and in place to provide a communications link with a [] when normal facilities are interrupted by political crisis.

c. These far-ranging responsibilities have caused OC to evolve a highly disciplined skills school and an external training program ranging from correspondence courses open to all ranks of communicators, to training in residence [] for senior personnel whose further training will benefit the Office.

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2. Training Requirements

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a. A corps of approximately men is required to man the radio, cryptography and equipment maintenance assignments of OC at headquarters and overseas. About of this number are cryptographers (CTC) fairly evenly ^{25X9} divided between headquarters and overseas. Another -odd men are radio operators (CTR) and here the staffing is predominantly overseas so that about of the personnel are on foreign duty at all times. The balance of the corps falls in the GS-9 -11 grade range and is occupied with supervisory, technical maintenance and instructor duties. Responsibility for the training of these and of all other personnel in OC is assigned to the Telecommunications Training and Techniques Staff (OC-T).

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b. The character and volume of training administered by OC-T in 1959 is summarized in the following table:

25X9

OC personnel trained in OTR courses	
OC personnel trained by non-OTR components	
Total non-Communications training	
OC personnel in external and part-time training	
OC personnel in correspondence training(6/1/60)	
Total	
Communications training:	
Cryptographic	non-OC personnel
	OC personnel
Total	
Operations	OC personnel
Technical	non-OC personnel
	OC personnel
Total	
Covert	non-OC personnel
OC Orientation	non-OC personnel
	OC personnel
Total	
Grand Total	

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3. Training Structure

a. Headquarters training in communications is an exclusive responsibility of the Office of Communications and is provided at its own facility known as the [] training facility was inaugurated in 1951. Considerations of OSS precedence, security, highly specialized instructor qualifications and unique equipment dictated the decision that communications training remain with OC rather than fall to the Office of

the control of the OC Engineering Staff. In the event of an emergency OC training would probably require location elsewhere. *Also PG. 6 under here*

b. The training corps at [] consists of [] instructors and support personnel. These compose four training faculties manned as follows: 25X9

Cryptographic instruction	[]	instructors	recruited from Signal Center
Technical instruction	[]	instructors	recruited from Engineering Staff
Operations instruction	[]	instructors	recruited from Operations Division via OC-T
Special training	[]	instructors	recruited from Special Projects Staff

c. The typical CTR (radio operator) recruit is a high school graduate who has completed military service including training and experience in communications. He enters OC as a GS-6 and is sent immediately to [] 25X1

[] course in radio operations and cryptography. The basic training includes [] a Comprehensive Radio Operator Course intermeshed with [] cryptographic training and terminating with a [] live problem exercise as a final test of proficiency. At the end of this period,

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the graduate is promoted to GS-7 and returned to headquarters preparatory to assignment overseas.

d. The CTC (cryptographer) receives [] formal training [] He is given no training in radio or equipment maintenance. At the end of this period he is assigned to the Signal Center at headquarters in the status of apprentice where he will receive on-the-job training and experience for about one year before assignment overseas. The CTC is the less skilled assignment and his pay scale lags about one grade behind that of the CTR in the GS-7 -10 pay range. 25X1

e. The OC pattern of assignment provides for initial field

[] and headquarters. The radio operator will spend most of his time in the field with fairly brief headquarters visits sandwiched in for training. Eight months prior to the end of each overseas tour the CTR is given an assessment test to evaluate his proficiency and identify weaknesses for which refresher training will be prescribed. A passing grade in the assessment test is now a mandatory requirement for promotion to the journeyman level - GS-8. An average of three and one-half weeks of refresher training is being given at [] at the present time to returnees. This amount has fallen steadily since inauguration of the testing system in 1957 and speaks for the discipline and high efficiency of the program.

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4. Evaluation

a. The Office of Communications has not lacked nor failed to respond to pressure from its customers to increase the capacity and efficiency of its service. Its work in the research and development of new equipment is in fact largely responsible for the new program known as in which the DD/I and DD/P are collaborating to bring information reports transmission out of the 19th century and on to a basis that will surpass present-day cables in speed, accuracy and security.

b. The growth of automation is having an increasingly significant impact on the personnel and training policies of OC. Pilot training is planned this year for the blending of the cryptographer and the radio operator into a new type of communicator to be assigned to the operation of the latest, nearly automatic equipment. He will not supersede these specialists for many kinds of jobs but he will be adapted at less cost in training to an increasingly important area of communications operations.

c. The accomplishments in the field of refresher training are highly creditable to OC as reflected in the decreasing length of training required by experienced personnel. It also speaks well of the quality of field supervision where the principal opportunities lie to encourage self-improvement by review and enrollment in correspondence courses.

d. The present-day cryptographer and radio operator personnel are very much cut-off from the rest of the Agency. The OTR courses in intelligence orientation and operations familiarization are required only of those employees making the jump to GS-11. The intelligence orientation requirement was eliminated

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in the early fifties for OC communicator recruits. In the present very tight promotion situation most communicators face long periods of service at present grades. An opportunity exists to stiffen the motivation of men in such circumstances through continuing awareness of the Agency's structure and objectives and, in particular, by keeping them well informed of new developments in the technology of communications.

e. Little evidence was developed concerning possible deficiencies in the content of technical training. There is some protest among the rank and file about the emphasis on theoretical aspects of electronics in their training of radio operators but no evidence that it does not yield a valid return particularly from the more capable students. OC has been conscious of the problem of instructor efficiency and has obtained assistance from the educational methods specialist in OTR in improving its performance. Through good administration of a homogeneous staff the OC school has been relatively free of the problem of unpredictable enrollments and course cancellations which have plagued OTR at headquarters. OC would appear to boast the best record in the Agency in setting standards of proficiency, then seeing that every employee receives the training necessary to meet and maintain these standards. Our only recommendation is that the communications school remain unchanged from its present form, status and successful method of operation.

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E. Technical School

1. Introduction

a. Training Clandestine Service personnel in technical tradecraft skills is a major responsibility of Technical Services Division (TSD), DD/P. The Technical School, staffed and administered by TSD, has been established for this purpose.

b. Within the organizational structure of TSD, the Chief of Training is a member of the Plans and Training Group, the senior staff element of the Division. The Chief of Training serves as an advisor to Chief, TSD, in training matters, as the focal point of contact with DTR, and as administrator of the Technical School.

2. The Technical School

TSD


a. Organization

(1) Technical School is organized as an integrated component to provide technical training in the Headquarters area. It is physically located in R&S Building where its facilities consist of four rooms equipped with technical gear, a general classroom, small conference room, training aids room, vault and office space for the Chief and Administrative Assistants. Space is generally adequate for the present size of classes and methods of instruction but there is no room for significant expansion without dispossessing other tenants of the building. The training equipment inventory is valued at approximately \$100,000.


(2) The faculty consists of a Chief Instructor, five senior and seven assistant instructors. In addition there are two other employees serving as Registrar and secretary.

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(3) Eight regularly scheduled courses and one semiannual seminar are conducted by Technical School. These cover the range of TDS's technical operational support functions as follows: 25X1



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(4) The first three of these plus the  are regarded by Technical School as basic to the needs of all case officers. The balance are intended to serve selected officers required to acquire more



They are scheduled frequently enough so that there is no significant problem in dealing with tutorial requirements.

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b. Instructors

(1) Most of the instructors are drawn from the Technical Aids (operational support) area of TSD and with only one exception they have had overseas experience. Each has a primary skill and already has or is in process of developing secondary skills at a level that will enable him to instruct in any course. This provides an unusual degree of flexibility in the movement of instructors wherever they are needed and in the rescheduling of courses on short notice.

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(2) All instructors are required to take the Operations Familiarization Course at [] and the Instructional Techniques Course at OTR headquarters in preparation for their assignments. This in addition to their basic skills qualifications and overseas operational experience provides the Technical School with a high level of instructor competence. 25X9

c. Activities

(1) The total attendance for all Technical School training during CY 1959 was []

[]

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(2) In addition to the scheduled and tutorial training functions regularly performed Chief, TSD Training, and the instructors of the Technical School are frequently called upon for briefings in various aspects of technical tradecraft. While no accurate record is maintained of the manhours devoted to this activity it does assume significant proportions. Instructors also participate in training courses conducted by OTR and give lectures, briefings and demonstrations in certain military training programs.

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d. Relationship with OTR

(1) The Chief of Training, TSD, keeps in close touch with OTR and properly coordinates his activities with the DTR as required by [] Technical School courses are reviewed by the OTR Educational

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Specialist and all instructors are required to take the OTR Instructional Techniques course. In this way DTR gives technical supervision to the TSD training effort according to his assigned responsibility.

(2) In the training and briefing of contract agents and representatives of foreign intelligence services Chief of Training coordinates with Chief, Covert Training, OTR, or with the operating division as appropriate. Technical School instructors are provided to perform their services either in Covert Training installations or in safe sites controlled by TSD.

3. Evaluation

a. Opinions gathered from Clandestine Service supervisory and operating personnel concerning the effectiveness of Technical School training were generally very favorable. Course content, quality of instruction, school facilities and management were acknowledged to be uniformly superior. The flexibility displayed by Technical School in meeting unusual demands and the cooperative spirit with which unscheduled requirements were accepted received special commendation.

b. There was divided opinion on the degree to which case officers should be trained in technical skills. Such opinion was influenced by proximity to TSD overseas bases where the services of specialists can be obtained on short notice. Branch chiefs, for example, whose stations are located in the more remote areas, preferred to have their case officers trained in greater depth and to be more self-sufficient in technical tradecraft. In those areas where TSD technicians are readily available, indoctrination in TSD capabilities is held to be more appropriate to the needs of the station. Technical School

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has met this problem in a most practical way by designing its courses to develop an acceptable level of skill in the shortest time possible. It is basic training intended to enable the case officer to perform effectively with a minimum of support but not intended to make him an expert in any of the technical fields.

c. The ultimate test of training is the proficiency demonstrated by the trainee in actual operating situations. Technical School has been largely unsuccessful in obtaining critical comments or appraisals of the effectiveness of its training either from the field or headquarters. Field reporting does not include comment on such subjects as the technical competence or lack thereof of case officers -- and headquarters apparently has not been concerned with such evaluations. In any event the Chief of Training has had to be content with a negative response that in the absence of criticism the efforts of Technical School are found to be satisfactory.

d. A comparison of the present state of technical training provided by TSD with conditions found in the 1956 IG survey of TSS shows that substantial improvement has taken place. Training as a major responsibility has been accorded proper status in the organizational structure and is receiving effective support from Chief, TSD, and his senior staff officers. The whole effort has been upgraded, facilities improved, and a sound program developed. Meaningful training standards for TSD personnel are being applied and phased requirements for minimum training in several fields have been established. In all TSD training is being handled with notable competence and effectiveness.

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4. Major Problems

a. Probably the principal problem with which Chief of Training, TSD, must contend is the inadequacy of guidance and direction from the DD/P. As was found in Operations School and elsewhere, the initiative for the development of training standards and doctrine has been passed to the trainers by default. The Chief of Training has found it necessary to establish training standards for case officers based upon his own personal experiences and the experiences of others in TSD. He outlined the courses and determined the content and level applying such limited criteria as the length of time he could hope to have students made available for training and their ability to absorb technical subjects based on past performances. The course outlines were then presented to the DD/P Training Officer for review and approval which was customarily granted without question. The DD/P has not stipulated the basic training required for all operating personnel nor has he established minimum standards of proficiency in technical skills to be acquired and maintained by case officers.

b. A related problem and one which has a direct bearing on operational support provided by TSD concerns the depth of case officer training in certain technical subjects. TSD maintains a staff of technicians in headquarters and in its overseas bases to furnish direct technical operational support to Clandestine Service field installations. A good deal of TDY travel is involved and TSD is plagued with the usual difficulties inherent in this type of service in trying to meet the demands of the operators. It appears logical to assume that requirements for support service could be reduced by increasing the capability of the case officer to do more for himself.

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It is recommended that:

The DD/P study the extent to which it is feasible to develop a greater capability in technical tradecraft in operations officers, establish minimum standards of technical training as basic to the required preparation of all operations officers and issue policy accordingly for the guidance of the Technical School, TSD.

f. In any consideration of the total problem of training employees for clandestine operations the question inevitably arises of the divided jurisdiction between TSD and OTR. Technical skills are as much a part of operational tradecraft as are recruiting, elicitation or the handling of agents and it is logical to assume that all such training should be under centralized control. Technical training has been the responsibility of TSD since its inception and although beset by inadequacies in its earlier stages it has now developed into a well organized, effective program. No major problems attributable to the separation of functions have been found. The transfer of Technical School to OTR would not improve the quality of instruction and the slight advantage of economy of administration would be offset by management difficulties in obtaining the services of qualified technicians, a problem that has plagued TSD even when the source of such talent is under its direct control. At some time in the future it may be desirable to consolidate all operational training under a single program in OTR but for the present we recommend no change.

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V. THE FUTURE OF TRAINING IN THE AGENCY

A. Critique of Present Program

1. Summarizing the data presented in the preceding sections of this report we find in many respects a very encouraging picture of accomplishment and, even more encouraging, a determined effort in many places toward greater achievements in the effective preparation of Agency employees for intelligence work. Notable progress has been made over the past few years particularly in the vital area of operational training for which no comparable effort exists outside the Agency. The magnitude of training activities is substantial though certainly not excessive. The results are generally acknowledged to justify the money and manpower invested by the Agency in this essential program.

2. From a more critical point of view certain significant weaknesses emerge which tend to blur the picture and retard the development of a more effective program. Perhaps the most significant of these is the lack of acceptance on the part of many command officers of their responsibility for the training of their subordinates. Training is a function of command the responsibility for which cannot be transferred to supporting or service elements. (The OTR and other training units can provide centralized facilities, expert services and good administration but only the command echelons can set standards and levels of skill and competence and require their subordinates to meet them. In the Clandestine Service, most particularly, this has not been done. Uniform standards for operations officers (both headquarters and field) have not been established nor has officially approved doctrine been prescribed for

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use in training courses. Training still is permissive and is subject frequently to the whims of individuals and lower echelon supervisors. Only those officers entering the Clandestine Service through the JOTP, are sure to have fulfilled the operational training required and that is accomplished before they come under the administrative control of the DD/P.

3. Another significant weakness is the inadequacy of communication between using components and training units. Both OTR and Technical School, TSD, for example, have made repeated efforts to obtain evaluations of course content, quality and levels of instruction and appraisals of effectiveness but with little success. Critical comments solicited by the inspection team were freely given but upon further exploration it was found that such criticisms were seldom passed on to the training elements. Reporting from the field on the degree of competence displayed by officers of all categories is practically non-existent.

4. A third major weakness is the failure to closely relate training to career planning and management. The absence of long range career planning was observed in the IG's study of the Agency's Career Service Program and the knowledge gained in the course of this study serves to underscore the need for such planning. Without it a sound training program cannot be developed. Training is costly and the Agency can afford the investment only if it can be assured of an adequate return.

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5. Finally, although there is a multitude of individual courses on most subjects required by the intelligence profession, they have not been molded into an integrated cohesive program that will ensure the proper preparation of Agency officers as they progress throughout their careers. The JOT program is a start in this direction but must be carried to its logical conclusion if it is to become the means of supplying the able competent officers the Agency so badly needs. The recommendations made in the preceding sections of this report, especially those pertaining to the JOT program will go far to strengthen the Agency's training effort.

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B. Fundamental Principles of Training

1. As we have already noted there is no question about the Director's authority to expend federal funds for the training of Agency employees in the field of intelligence and we also have found that in the absence of any alternative it is necessary for such training to be conducted internally. Before proceeding to outline a training program projecting into the future certain fundamental principles of training should be examined.

2. Men learn by experience to which formal training is only an adjunct. Theoretically it would be possible to take a young man of average aptitudes and accomplishments and through a complex series of exposures to work experiences ultimately produce a seasoned, trained intelligence officer. By means of a well organized training program it can be done far better and in much shorter time. It requires, however, a coordinated effort on the part of command echelons to develop an integrated program and an adequately staffed and equipped vehicle for its implementation.

3. Training for the intelligence profession is analogous in some respects to that of other professions in its requirement for initial broad general preparation to be followed by advanced training in specialized fields. The young man who enters West Point, for example, spends four years acquiring the rudiments of Army military science to be graduated as a most junior officer into a specific branch of the service. Similarly physician and lawyer devote a major portion of their time to the broader aspects of their professions before specialization.

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And so it should be in the intelligence profession. The Agency's training program should adopt the principle of a comprehensive general education in all facets of intelligence work for all its professional employees before specific permanent assignments are made.

4. Learning is a continuous process whether it be in the form of knowledge gained through work experience or through formal training courses. Since learning is a matter of progression and growth it follows logically that the training program should be designed to accommodate this principle. Training should be phased to meet the needs of career development with an orderly progression through the various stages of the individual's service in the Agency.

5. Training also must have clearly defined objectives and such objectives should be formed in terms of the work for which the individual is being prepared. Standards of training should be related to the standards of performance the individual is expected to meet. No man should be assigned a job he is not prepared to perform and the satisfactory attainment of a training objective should be a required qualification for assignment.

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C. The Apprenticeship

1. General Preparatory Training

a. At this stage in the Agency's development there are two influencing factors which bear upon the future of training. The present professional staff has to a large degree taken existing training courses applicable to its functions or at least has acquired experience equivalent to such courses, and the JOT Program is evolving into the principal source of new employees in the professional ranks. As the proportion of JOT's rises and the training needs of the present staff are satisfied through existing courses the requirements for basic training for non-JOT's will vanish. Hence the opportunity is present to modify our present approach and establish a comprehensive integrated program which will serve for the years to come.

b. In designing such a program a distinction must be drawn between staff employees and all others. The staff employee category includes the great bulk of professional officers in headquarters and those overseas who man the Agency's regular installations. Included in the "all other" categories would be deep cover staff agents, contract and career agents and any other employees whose training would have to be conducted by covert or clandestine means. The program we are concerned with is devoted to the staff employee category.

c. Adhering to the fundamental principles of training the first step would appear to be the organizing of a comprehensive, general preparatory training course in intelligence work for all new professional employees. This course should cover all aspects of the intelligence

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process including collection, production and support. Although specific skills training should not be injected at this early stage, the course should be more than a mere orientation. It should be a thorough indoctrination in the intelligence profession and would resemble the current 10-weeks phase of the JOTP. More time should be devoted to support activities than the two days now allotted in the JOT course and perhaps the overseas effectiveness course could be deferred to a later stage but the remaining subject matter should be retained. In addition general skills applicable to most of the Agency's functions should be included such as observation, elicitation, deduction, interpretation and reporting. These would contribute to evaluation as well as training.

d. Completion of the initial phase of general preparatory training will not qualify the trainee to immediately engage in productive work. Ideally for a well rounded education in intelligence a succession of work experiences in the three Deputy Directorates should take place at this point. Unfortunately the number of trainees involved would make this extremely difficult to administer and would impose an intolerable burden on the management of operating and support components called upon to provide such on-the-job training. It is possible however to devise a program of simulated work experience which would incorporate the pertinent functions of the intelligence process within a reasonable period of time.

e. This fundamental course should lay the foundation for advanced and specialized training but it should be sufficiently self-contained to stand by itself as a qualifying factor for a career in CIA. Completion of this phase should permit a coarse screening, a "wash out"

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stage, which will identify and eliminate the obviously unfit. When this stage has been reached a tentative determination may be made of the vocation the individual should pursue throughout the major portion of his career. The duration of this elementary phase is difficult to fix without making a detailed analysis of subject matter and course content which is beyond the purview of this study but the present JOT experience would indicate that a maximum of six months would provide an adequate period of time for a well rounded course.

f. At this point the junior officer has received a thorough indoctrination in intelligence work and has been exposed to the workings of the various subdivisions of the Agency. He should now be ready to acquire the skills he will use for the major portion of his career. Those to be assigned to the Clandestine Service will go on to learn the trade-craft of espionage; others to learn intelligence research and analysis and the production of finished intelligence; and still others to take up the various functions of support. The duration of advanced training will vary according to the requirements and standards of the work to be performed but not until the entire training period has been satisfactorily completed should the trainee be released for permanent assignment. Less than satisfactory performance in basic training should be cause for termination automatically.

2. Skills Training

a. For the support services of the DD/S area skills training presents no unique problems. As we have noted earlier the major support components already have good training programs conducted internally and

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augmented by the generous application of external training facilities. Furthermore many trainees destined for support work will bring with them certain basic skills already acquired before entering on duty with the Agency.

b. There is one area in which more can be done. The selection and training of general support officers, for which there is a growing demand, should be started at an earlier stage. This is more a matter of development than formalized training although there is ample room for a combination of both. The general support officer must have an intimate knowledge of all support services and also a comprehensive understanding of the intelligence activities he is to support. He must be a broad guage individual with a capacity for absorbing the intricacies of the many faceted support functions and the ability to administer them effectively. He is a most important cog in the Agency's machinery who sometimes is not accorded the recognition he deserves. It takes a good deal of time to produce an able general support officer and there is a need for an organized program to develop the standards and requirements and provide the means to reach the objectives.

c. In the DD/I area advanced training problems also are relatively simple to resolve. The fundamental skills required are in research, collation, analysis and interpretation, and the preparation of finished intelligence reports. Certain courses already provided by OTR serve these purposes although some reservations as to quality and level of instruction were found among consumers. It was also noted however that the OTR training effort did not receive a full measure of support from

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the DD/I area particularly in establishing standards related to job requirements, the development of doctrine and in providing the services of qualified instructors. Needless to say full cooperation on both sides is necessary if effective results are to be obtained.

d. The diversification of functions in the DD/I area will produce requirements for advanced training beyond those specified above. The information gathering functions of the Office of Operations, for example, would require additional training in the basic skills involved as would the information storage and retrieval functions of OCR.

e. The complexity of Clandestine Service activities creates additional problems in the pace and scope of advanced training and the trainee must be prepared to undertake a lengthy apprenticeship. Since espionage is fundamental to all clandestine operations it follows logically that all operations officers should have a thorough grounding in operational tradecraft, technical skills, and the management of operations. Advanced training for the Clandestine Service officer should include all these things and perhaps lay the foundation for further future development but should not extend beyond this point at this stage.

f. Overseas operational experience is an essential element of the education of an operations officer and it should be acquired at the earliest possible time. There is much disagreement on the proper timing of the initial tour of field duty for the junior officer but the consensus favors an early start. There seems to be little to gain from a lengthy headquarters assignment particularly when training already has covered much of the activity and we would advocate that the field tour begin not

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more than three months after completion of the course. This will provide ample time for preparation for travel and an indoctrination in the activities of the field station of assignment.

g. During this initial tour the junior officer must be maintained in a training status. He is still an apprentice and his purpose in being overseas is to learn at first hand about clandestine operations. The station of assignment should be large enough to accommodate a few trainees without seriously upsetting the staffing patterns and should be provided with a general outline of the nature of on-the-job training the junior officer should receive. The mentor system is suggested.

h. Upon return from the overseas assignment the junior officer should be ready for specialized training in depth in a selected functional field or in a geographic area. The trainee has acquired a firm foundation of training and experience; he has been exposed (perhaps for the first time) to a foreign environment and culture; he has had time to mature, and to be able to decide for himself what the future holds for him; and, since he has been under constant observation during this entire period, the Agency is able to judge his potential and capabilities and can exercise sound judgment as to his further development. Not until he reaches this point in his education should the junior officer undertake to engage in one of the several specialties which comprise the major operational functions of the Clandestine Service. If he is to continue as an FI officer he should have intensive language and area training. If covert action is to be his special field his training will include psychological warfare, or paramilitary operations.

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Similarly specialized training should be prescribed for officers destined for labor operations, counterintelligence, scientific and technical and other major operational fields. The duration of specialized training cannot be fixed; it will vary from a few months for a functional specialty to two years or more for difficult language training. It should be intensive and complete and have as its objective the best possible preparation of a professional intelligence officer.

1. Summarized briefly the pattern that emerges for the training of Clandestine Service officers is this: (a) a general preparatory phase of indoctrination in all aspects of intelligence work, (b) an advanced phase for the acquisition of fundamental skills, (c) a period of on-the-job training in headquarters and overseas, and, (d) the specialized training phase of intensive study in depth. The general pattern will be the same for DD/I and DD/S officers except for the period of overseas experience. The time element will be for CS officers at least 24 to 48 months, allowing a tour overseas, plus the variable period of specialty training; for DD/I and DD/S, not in excess of six months.

*No sharp distinction
between specialist
& generalist*

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D. Mid-career Training

1. The need for some form of training at the middle career level is acknowledged by trainers and consumers alike but there is little agreement on the nature, extent or even timing of such a course. Mid-career training generally throughout government and industry is accepted as a part of an overall program of the proper preparation of people to perform effectively in their assigned functions. The Foreign Service Institute, for example, offers a course for Foreign Service Officers at the FSO 3, 4, and 5 levels which is designed to "encourage the development of a broad and integrated professional philosophy that will enable the officer to function with a more acute awareness and a deeper understanding of the essential character and role of his profession." (It should be noted that the 12 week course includes two weeks devoted to executive management.) While this purpose may not be completely appropriate to the Agency, it does contain some of the essential characteristics applicable to any program of training at mid-career.

2. Before advancing suggestions for the purpose and nature of such training a definition of mid-career should be agreed upon. The middle point of a man's career will, of course, vary with the individual and will be influenced by circumstances both favorable and unfavorable. An age and grade projection of what may be considered an average career would take this form:

GS Grade	9	11	12	13	14	15
Age	25	30	35	40	45	50

In actual practice intervals between promotions in the lower grades may be shorter and longer in the upper grades. While this projection admittedly is rather arbitrary, it seems reasonable to assume that the young man of 25

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entering the service should aspire to grade GS-15 by the time he reaches 50 years of age. If he does not his chances of attaining that grade thereafter diminish rapidly. We realize that 25 years of service is not regarded by many as a full lifetime career and that GS-15 is not the full limit of grade levels available. The projection may be extended through GS-18 and age 65 without materially altering the relationship of age and grade. The number of supergrade positions always will be limited and since we are seeking something having application to the majority of officers we believe it more practical to use the projection shown above.

3. The middle point in grade falls between GS-12 and 13, in age between 35 and 40, and in length of service between 10 and 15 years. This point appears to be most appropriate for a number of reasons. At the GS-13 level an officer usually is expected to assume major supervisory responsibilities for which he should be thoroughly prepared. One of the deficiencies noted in the current training effort is the inadequacy of proper preparation of employees assigned managerial responsibilities. Grade GS-13 also is in many areas of the Agency a crucial point; it is a "break-through" level which distinguishes between journeymen and senior officers. It is in effect the gateway to more senior positions and one of the more difficult to penetrate.

4. The age bracket of 35 to 40 also is very significant. It is the stage at which the individual becomes more mature, he is more aware of the full extent of his responsibilities both at work and at home and his concern with his future is greatly sharpened. It is no coincidence that the average age of professional officers in grade GS-12 and over who leave the Agency for some other occupation is 39.4. It is frequently a turning point in a man's life.

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5. In terms of years of service this middle point is most appropriate also. The officer has served his apprenticeship and at least seven to twelve productive years in his specialty. He probably knows all there is to know about his job but has had little opportunity to participate in or learn about other activities. The danger of atrophy is greatest at this point.

6. A mid-career training program designed with these factors in mind should have as its purpose: (a) to prepare officers to assume broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command; (b) to refresh and rekindle their motivation in the interest of the government and the intelligence service, and (c) to broaden their outlook of the Agency's mission through a better understanding of the interrelationships of its many parts.

7. We anticipate some initial difficulties in the development and scheduling of a mid-career program but as employees' promotion and growth rate stabilizes there should be a fairly uniform progression of officers through this mid-career stage which will provide standard, almost routine attendance for a regularly scheduled course. The seminar form of approximately 12 weeks is favored by most and would appear to be appropriate to the purpose.

It is recommended that:

The DCI authorize and direct the establishment of a mid-career training course for officers at the GS-12 and -13 level in order to prepare them for broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command, to refresh their motivation in the intelligence service and to broaden their understanding of the interrelationship of Agency functions.

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E. Senior Officer Training

1. One of the readily identifiable problem areas in the Agency today is the pronounced shortage of senior level officers thoroughly experienced in all aspects of the intelligence profession capable of understanding and effectively dealing with complex Agency-wide and inter-agency problems. The Agency finds itself in this circumstance partly through its historical evolution in which some components descended in unbroken line from World War II organizations; partly because the organizational structure has fostered the growth of three semi-autonomous sub-divisions; partly because a sound security concept of compartmentation has been permitted to develop into a policy approaching "apartheid"; and partly because the pressure of operational and functional demands placed on the Agency since its inception have compelled the direction of its great energy to the rapid development of people to do specific jobs well and defer to some later date the development of people who can do all jobs well. There also enters here some element of the prodigal use of talent because it is plentiful, the substitution of numbers of people to make up for lack of broad individual competence and the resorting to group judgments in place of executive skill.

2. Preparing individuals to assume and effectively discharge the responsibilities of senior management is more a problem of development than formalized training although the latter has a definite place in the scheme of things. As we pointed out in the Inspector General's report on the Career Service Program, the absence of an organized method of career development has seriously hampered the proper preparation of officers for key positions and some sound long range planning must be instituted to meet this need. We

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still are hopeful that such an effort will be successful in the near future. For the present, however, there is an immediate need to do everything possible to improve the effectiveness of today's staff of senior officers and those to be selected in the next few years to come. For this purpose we suggest a senior officer training program.

3. The objective of a senior officer program may be briefly stated in these terms: to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government. This objective is sufficiently broad to encompass all aspects of the intelligence profession, the internal management of Agency affairs and the inter-relationships of the Agency with the intelligence community and the policy making elements of the government.

4. The level at which this program is aimed should not be lower than GS-15 although a case can be made to include selected individuals at the GS-14 level. It should be regarded as the preparatory phase for officers entering the final stages of their careers with the Agency and therefore provide a rounding out of their earlier experiences and training.

5. The greatest benefit of this program is to be derived from the interchange of opinions and ideas through the exploration of the entire spectrum of Agency and community problems. For this purpose a combination of seminars and case studies with a minimum of orientational lecturing would be the most productive. A mixed enrollment of DD/P, DD/I, and DD/S officers could profit by exposure to each other's problems. A budget officer, for example, might make a solid contribution to a discussion of counterintelligence operations, a case officer might speak with conviction on information storage

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and retrieval, and an analyst may offer valuable ideas on logistical matters. Executive management should be stressed at this level but no subject, operational or administrative, should be neglected.

6. A senior officer program to be most effective must be allotted a period of time adequate to the full development of its objective. A similar program, though on a somewhat broader scale, conducted by the Foreign Service Institute runs for nine months. We do not contemplate so extensive a program to meet Agency needs at the present time. As the program evolves in the future it may be found desirable to invite attendance by senior officers of other intelligence agencies in which event a longer course might be justified. For the initial effort at least and until experience can be gained we believe a course of about four months would be most effective.

7. In magnitude, taking into account the problems of administration and technical methods of handling such a program, it is suggested that enrollment be limited to not more than 40 officers at one time. The program should be conducted at least twice annually although it is believed possible to run two courses concurrently if necessary. A reasonable goal would appear to be the participation of 80 to 100 officers each year.*

*Note: At the present rate of promotion about 50 officers will enter the GS-15 level each year. It is anticipated that promotions will stabilize at this rate for the foreseeable future. This will permit ultimately scheduling the senior officer program semiannually with an attendance of about 25 at each session. For the first few years, however, the effort must be made to accommodate a large part of the present staff as well as the newly elevated officers.

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8. The question of location must also be considered. Ideally, from the academic point of view, an atmosphere relaxed and free from the tensions of normal Agency activities would provide the best surroundings for undisturbed concentration and thought. This would point to [] as the most appropriate site but practical considerations seem to impose insurmountable obstacles. Separation from family for an extended period of time, while tolerated by the JOT, would be strongly resented by the senior officers. Unlike the military services Agency facilities at [] do not provide for students' dependents and it would be economically unfeasible for the Agency [] even if the local market could meet the demand. It appears therefore that there is no alternative at present to conducting the program at headquarters with the attendant disadvantages of proximity at home offices and the ever present danger of interruptions and distraction by continuing contacts with working colleagues and associates.

9. The success of the program can be assured only by highest level direction and proper planning. Officers who are to participate must be released from regular duties for the full duration of the course and required replacements arranged for well in advance so that their functions can be carried on in their absence. It is our opinion that all officers should be required to participate upon reaching the GS-15 level but if this proves to be impractical, at least for the present, then selection should be based on merit, accomplishment and potential. Appointment should be regarded as a reward for achievement and an acknowledgement of superior ability opening the way to the highest levels of executive management.

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10. Other than the salaries of the participants no extraordinary cost is contemplated for this program. It should be administered by the DTR who will be expected to provide supporting services. In the initial formulation of the program the services of technical experts will be needed but instructors as such can be dispensed with. Seminar and discussion leaders can be drawn from the Agency at large or, better still, from among the participating officers themselves. None of the customary testing and evaluation practices are called for. It may be desirable to enlist and pay for some expert outside talent to handle such subjects as advanced management but the cost for such services would be modest when compared with the cost of full-time instructors.

11. On a number of occasions in the past suggestions have been made to establish an Intelligence Staff College along the lines of similar military institutions. Some such proposals have been reviewed in the process of this study and much thought has been given the matter. There is much to be said in favor of some form of staff college for intelligence officers but it is believed that the Agency is not yet ready for such an undertaking. A senior officers' program as outlined herein may well lead to the ultimate establishment of a broader and higher level school but to meet the Agency's most urgent need this program should be developed without delay.

It is recommended that:

The DCI authorize and direct that a senior officer program be established to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government generally in keeping with the outline described above.

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To summarize our views on the future of training in this Agency we advocate first, that the JOT system of recruitment, selection and training be adapted to meet all junior officer requirements throughout the Agency (about 250 annually at present); secondly, that an organized program of required training be instituted phased to coincide with and supplement professional career development and growth. The pattern we envision is one of annual classes of junior officers having the essential qualifications of background and motivation for intelligence work following an orderly progression of general preparation by means of comprehensive indoctrination and training in the basic skills of the profession; then the period of specialized training to prepare for the productive years to follow. The pattern is filled out by a mid-career training phase for selected officers ready to assume broader responsibilities and finally by a form of "terminal training" to develop the Agency's executives.

This pattern if followed will meet the bulk of the Agency's personnel requirements and will substantially raise the level of professional competence in every field. It is necessarily based on certain assumptions. It is assumed for example that command echelons will accept fully their responsibility for the proper preparation of the employees of their commands to do the jobs expected of them; that they will establish rigorous training and job standards and insist that they be met; that they will produce the authoritative doctrine essential to their training needs; and that they will require the necessary long range personnel planning so essential to any training program. It is also assumed that the Director of Training and heads of training elements will continue to strive for greater competence in instructors, better training techniques and facilities and more skillful administration.

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In conclusion we would like to reiterate that the success of the Agency depends in large measure on the success of its training and development program. In the intelligence field there is no room for failure.

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